The same is true of the relation called ‘knowing,’ which may connect an idea with a reality.  My own account of this relation is ambulatory through and through.  I say that we know an object by means of an idea, whenever we ambulate towards the object under the impulse which the idea communicates.  If we believe in so-called ‘sensible’ realities, the idea may not only send us towards its object, but may put the latter into our very hand, make it our immediate sensation.  But, if, as most reflective people opine, sensible realities are not ‘real’ realities, but only their appearances, our idea brings us at least so far, puts us in touch with reality’s most authentic appearances and substitutes.  In any case our idea brings us into the object’s neighborhood, practical or ideal, gets us into commerce with it, helps us towards its closer acquaintance, enables us to foresee it, class it, compare it, deduce it,—­in short, to deal with it as we could not were the idea not in our possession.

The idea is thus, when functionally considered, an instrument for enabling us the better to have to do with the object and to act about it.  But it and the object are both of them bits of the general sheet and tissue of reality at large; and when we say that the idea leads us towards the object, that only means that it carries us forward through intervening tracts of that reality into the object’s closer neighborhood, into the midst of its associates at least, be these its physical neighbors, or be they its logical congeners only.  Thus carried into closer quarters, we are in an improved situation as regards acquaintance and conduct; and we say that through the idea we now know the object better or more truly.

My thesis is that the knowing here is made by the ambulation through the intervening experiences.  If the idea led us nowhere, or from that object instead of towards it, could we talk at all of its having any cognitive quality?  Surely not, for it is only when taken in conjunction with the intermediate experiences that it gets related to that particular object rather than to any other part of nature.  Those intermediaries determine what particular knowing function it exerts.  The terminus they guide us to tells us what object it ‘means,’ the results they enrich us with ‘verify’ or ‘refute’ it.  Intervening experiences are thus as indispensable foundations for a concrete relation of cognition as intervening space is for a relation of distance.  Cognition, whenever we take it concretely, means determinate ‘ambulation,’ through intermediaries, from a terminus a quo to, or towards, a terminus ad quem.  As the intermediaries are other than the termini, and connected with them by the usual associative bonds (be these ‘external’ or be they logical, i.e., classificatory, in character), there would appear to be nothing especially unique about the processes of knowing.  They fall wholly within experience; and we need use, in describing them, no other categories than those which we employ in describing other natural processes.