It will come from those philosophers to whom ‘thought,’ in the sense of a knowledge of relations, is the all in all of mental life; and who hold a merely feeling consciousness to be no better—­one would sometimes say from their utterances, a good deal worse—­than no consciousness at all.  Such phrases as these, for example, are common to-day in the mouths of those who claim to walk in the footprints of Kant and Hegel rather than in the ancestral English paths:  ’A perception detached from all others, “left out of the heap we call a mind,” being out of all relation, has no qualities—­is simply nothing.  We can no more consider it than we can see vacancy.’  ’It is simply in itself fleeting, momentary, unnameable (because while we name it it has become another), and for the very same reason unknowable, the very negation of knowability.’  ’Exclude from what we have considered real all qualities constituted by relation, we find that none are left.’

Altho such citations as these from the writings of Professor Green might be multiplied almost indefinitely, they would hardly repay the pains of collection, so egregiously false is the doctrine they teach.  Our little supposed feeling, whatever it may be, from the cognitive point of view, whether a bit of knowledge or a dream, is certainly no psychical zero.  It is a most positively and definitely qualified inner fact, with a complexion all its own.  Of course there are many mental facts which it is not.  It knows Q, if Q be a reality, with a very minimum of knowledge.  It neither dates nor locates it.  It neither classes nor names it.  And it neither knows itself as a feeling, nor contrasts itself with other feelings, nor estimates its own duration or intensity.  It is, in short, if there is no more of it than this, a most dumb and helpless and useless kind of thing.

But if we must describe it by so many negations, and if it can say nothing about itself or about anything else, by what right do we deny that it is a psychical zero?  And may not the ‘relationists’ be right after all?

In the innocent looking word ‘about’ lies the solution of this riddle; and a simple enough solution it is when frankly looked at.  A quotation from a too seldom quoted book, the Exploratio Philosophica of John Grote (London, 1865), p. 60, will form the best introduction to it.

‘Our knowledge,’ writes Grote, ’may be contemplated in either of two ways, or, to use other words, we may speak in a double manner of the “object” of knowledge.  That is, we may either use language thus:  we know a thing, a man, etc.; or we may use it thus:  we know such and such things about the thing, the man, etc.  Language in general, following its true logical instinct, distinguishes between these two applications of the notion of knowledge, the one being yvwvai, noscere, kennen, connaitre, the other being eidevai, scire, wissen, savoir.  In the origin, the former may be considered more what I have