named, is
the datum,
the phenomenon,
or the experience. The paper is
in the mind and the mind is around the paper, because
paper and mind are only two names that are given later
to the one experience, when, taken in a larger world
of which it forms a part, its connections are traced
in different directions. [Footnote: What is meant
by this is that ’the experience’ can be
referred to either of two great associative systems,
that of the experiencer’s mental history, or
that of the experienced facts of the world. Of
both of these systems it forms part, and may be regarded,
indeed, as one of their points of intersection.
One might let a vertical line stand for the mental
history; but the same object, O, appears also in the
mental history of different persons, represented by
the other vertical lines. It thus ceases to be
the private property of one experience, and becomes,
so to speak, a shared or public thing. We can
track its outer history in this way, and represent
it by the horizontal line. (It is also known
representatively at other points of the vertical lines,
or intuitively there again, so that the line of its
outer history would have to be looped and wandering,
but I make it straight for simplicity’s sake.)]
In any case, however, it is the same stuff figures
in all the sets of lines.
To know immediately, then, or
intuitively, is for mental content
and object to be identical.
This is a very different definition from that which
we gave of representative knowledge; but neither definition
involves those mysterious notions of self-transcendency
and presence in absence which are such essential parts
of the ideas of knowledge, both of philosophers and
of common men. [Footnote: The reader will observe
that the text is written from the point of view of
NAIF realism or common sense, and avoids raising the
idealistic controversy.]
III
Humanism and truth [Footnote:
Reprinted, with slight verbal revision, from Mind,
vol. xiii, N. S., p. 457 (October, 1904). A couple
of interpolations from another article in Mind, ‘Humanism
and truth once more,’ in vol. xiv, have been
made.]
Receiving from the Editor of Mind an advance
proof of Mr. Bradley’s article on ‘Truth
and Practice,’ I understand this as a hint to
me to join in the controversy over ‘Pragmatism’
which seems to have seriously begun. As my name
has been coupled with the movement, I deem it wise
to take the hint, the more so as in some quarters
greater credit has been given me than I deserve, and
probably undeserved discredit in other quarters falls
also to my lot.