1.  The reality, external to the true idea;

2.  The critic, reader, or epistemologist, with his own belief, as warrant for this reality’s existence;

3.  The experienceable environment, as the vehicle or medium connecting knower with known, and yielding the cognitive relation;

4.  The notion of pointing, through this medium, to the reality, as one condition of our being said to know it;

5.  That of resembling it, and eventually affecting it, as determining the pointing to it and not to something else.

6.  The elimination of the ‘epistemological gulf,’ so that the whole truth-relation falls inside of the continuities of concrete experience, and is constituted of particular processes, varying with every object and subject, and susceptible of being described in detail.

The defects in this earlier account are:—­

1.  The possibly undue prominence given to resembling, which altho a fundamental function in knowing truly, is so often dispensed with;

2.  The undue emphasis laid upon operating on the object itself, which in many cases is indeed decisive of that being what we refer to, but which is often lacking, or replaced by operations on other things related to the object.

3.  The imperfect development of the generalized notion of the workability of the feeling or idea as equivalent to that satisfactory adaptation to the particular reality, which constitutes the truth of the idea.  It is this more generalized notion, as covering all such specifications as pointing, fitting, operating or resembling, that distinguishes the developed view of Dewey, Schiller, and myself.

4.  The treatment, [earlier], of percepts as the only realm of reality.  I now treat concepts as a co-ordinate realm.

The next paper represents a somewhat broader grasp of the topic on the writer’s part.

II

The tigers in India [Footnote:  Extracts from a presidential address before the American Psychological Association, published in the Psychological Review, vol. ii, p. 105 (1895).]

There are two ways of knowing things, knowing them immediately or intuitively, and knowing them conceptually or representatively.  Altho such things as the white paper before our eyes can be known intuitively, most of the things we know, the tigers now in India, for example, or the scholastic system of philosophy, are known only representatively or symbolically.

Suppose, to fix our ideas, that we take first a case of conceptual knowledge; and let it be our knowledge of the tigers in India, as we sit here.  Exactly what do we mean by saying that we here know the tigers?  What is the precise fact that the cognition so confidently claimed is known-as, to use Shadworth Hodgson’s inelegant but valuable form of words?