Therefore, continue our abstractionists, we must conceive it as essentially thus unrelated, so that even were a billion men to sport the same opinion, and only one man to differ, we could admit no collateral circumstances which might presumptively make it more probable that he, not they, should be wrong.  Truth, they say, follows not the counting of noses, nor is it only another name for a majority vote.  It is a relation that antedates experience, between our opinions and an independent something which the pragmatist account ignores, a relation which, tho the opinions of individuals should to all eternity deny it, would still remain to qualify them as false.  To talk of opinions without referring to this independent something, the anti-pragmatist assures us, is to play Hamlet with Hamlet’s part left out.

But when the pragmatist speaks of opinions, does he mean any such insulated and unmotived abstractions as are here supposed?  Of course not, he means men’s opinions in the flesh, as they have really formed themselves, opinions surrounded by their causes and the influences they obey and exert, and along with the whole environment of social communication of which they are a part and out of which they take their rise.  Moreover the ‘experience’ which the pragmatic definition postulates is the independent something which the anti-pragmatist accuses him of ignoring.  Already have men grown unanimous in the opinion that such experience is of an independent reality, the existence of which all opinions must acknowledge, in order to be true.  Already do they agree that in the long run it is useless to resist experience’s pressure; that the more of it a man has, the better position he stands in, in respect of truth; that some men, having had more experience, are therefore better authorities than others; that some are also wiser by nature and better able to interpret the experience they have had; that it is one part of such wisdom to compare notes, discuss, and follow the opinion of our betters; and that the more systematically and thoroughly such comparison and weighing of opinions is pursued, the truer the opinions that survive are likely to be.  When the pragmatist talks of opinions, it is opinions as they thus concretely and livingly and interactingly and correlatively exist that he has in mind; and when the anti-pragmatist tries to floor him because the word ‘opinion’ can also be taken abstractly and as if it had no environment, he simply ignores the soil out of which the whole discussion grows.  His weapons cut the air and strike no blow.  No one gets wounded in the war against caricatures of belief and skeletons of opinion of which the German onslaughts upon ‘relativismus’ consists.  Refuse to use the word ‘opinion’ abstractly, keep it in its real environment, and the withers of pragmatism remain unwrung.  That men do exist who are ‘opinionated,’ in the sense that their opinions are self-willed, is unfortunately a fact that must be admitted, no matter what one’s