that must be taken ‘account’ of incessantly (tho not necessarily merely copied) is evidently a difficult one to introduce to novices.  The situation reminds me of one that I have personally gone through.  I once wrote an essay on our right to believe, which I unluckily called the will to Believe.  All the critics, neglecting the essay, pounced upon the title.  Psychologically it was impossible, morally it was iniquitous.  The “will to deceive,” the “will to make-believe,” were wittily proposed as substitutes for it.

The alternative between pragmatism and rationalism, in the shape in which we now have it before us, is no longer A question in the theory of knowledge, it concerns the structure of the universe itself.

On the pragmatist side we have only one edition of the universe, unfinished, growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places where thinking beings are at work.

On the rationalist side we have a universe in many editions, one real one, the infinite folio, or edition de luxe, eternally complete; and then the various finite editions, full of false readings, distorted and mutilated each in its own way.

So the rival metaphysical hypotheses of pluralism and monism here come back upon us.  I will develope their differences during the remainder of our hour.

And first let me say that it is impossible not to see a temperamental difference at work in the choice of sides.  The rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and authoritative complexion:  the phrase ‘must be’ is ever on its lips.  The belly-band of its universe must be tight.  A radical pragmatist on the other hand is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature.  If he had to live in a tub like Diogenes he wouldn’t mind at all if the hoops were loose and the staves let in the sun.

Now the idea of this loose universe affects your typical rationalists in much the same way as ‘freedom of the press’ might affect a veteran official in the russian bureau of censorship; or as ‘simplified spelling’ might affect an elderly schoolmistress.  It affects him as the swarm of protestant sects affects a papist onlooker.  It appears as backboneless and devoid of principle as ‘opportunism’ in politics appears to an old-fashioned french legitimist, or to a fanatical believer in the divine right of the people.

For pluralistic pragmatism, truth grows up inside of all the finite experiences.  They lean on each other, but the whole of them, if such a whole there be, leans on nothing.  All ‘homes’ are in finite experience; finite experience as such is homeless.  Nothing outside of the flux secures the issue of it.  It can hope salvation only from its own intrinsic promises and potencies.