After discussing the unity of the universe in this pragmatic way, you ought to see why I said in my second lecture, borrowing the word from my friend G. Papini, that pragmatism tends to UNSTIFFEN all our theories.  The world’s oneness has generally been affirmed abstractly only, and as if anyone who questioned it must be an idiot.  The temper of monists has been so vehement, as almost at times to be convulsive; and this way of holding a doctrine does not easily go with reasonable discussion and the drawing of distinctions.  The theory of the Absolute, in particular, has had to be an article of faith, affirmed dogmatically and exclusively.  The One and All, first in the order of being and of knowing, logically necessary itself, and uniting all lesser things in the bonds of mutual necessity, how could it allow of any mitigation of its inner rigidity?  The slightest suspicion of pluralism, the minutest wiggle of independence of any one of its parts from the control of the totality, would ruin it.  Absolute unity brooks no degrees—­as well might you claim absolute purity for a glass of water because it contains but a single little cholera-germ.  The independence, however infinitesimal, of a part, however small, would be to the Absolute as fatal as a cholera-germ.

Pluralism on the other hand has no need of this dogmatic rigoristic temper.  Provided you grant some separation among things, some tremor of independence, some free play of parts on one another, some real novelty or chance, however minute, she is amply satisfied, and will allow you any amount, however great, of real union.  How much of union there may be is a question that she thinks can only be decided empirically.  The amount may be enormous, colossal; but absolute monism is shattered if, along with all the union, there has to be granted the slightest modicum, the most incipient nascency, or the most residual trace, of a separation that is not ‘overcome.’

Pragmatism, pending the final empirical ascertainment of just what the balance of union and disunion among things may be, must obviously range herself upon the pluralistic side.  Some day, she admits, even total union, with one knower, one origin, and a universe consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be the most acceptable of all hypotheses.  Meanwhile the opposite hypothesis, of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always to remain so, must be sincerely entertained.  This latter hypothesis is pluralism’s doctrine.  Since absolute monism forbids its being even considered seriously, branding it as irrational from the start, it is clear that pragmatism must turn its back on absolute monism, and follow pluralism’s more empirical path.

This leaves us with the common-sense world, in which we find things partly joined and partly disjoined.  ‘Things,’ then, and their ’conjunctions’—­what do such words mean, pragmatically handled?  In my next lecture, I will apply the pragmatic method to the stage of philosophizing known as Common Sense.