Far be it from me to deny the majesty of this conception, or its capacity to yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds.  But from the human point of view, no one can pretend that it doesn’t suffer from the faults of remoteness and abstractness.  It is eminently a product of what I have ventured to call the rationalistic temper.  It disdains empiricism’s needs.  It substitutes a pallid outline for the real world’s richness.  It is dapper; it is noble in the bad sense, in the sense in which to be noble is to be inapt for humble service.  In this real world of sweat and dirt, it seems to me that when a view of things is ‘noble,’ that ought to count as a presumption against its truth, and as a philosophic disqualification.  The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman.  His menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the empyrean.

Now pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has no such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under.  Moreover, she has no objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually carry you somewhere.  Interested in no conclusions but those which our minds and our experiences work out together, she has no a priori prejudices against theology.  If theological ideas prove to have A value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much.  For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged.

What I said just now about the Absolute of transcendental idealism is a case in point.  First, I called it majestic and said it yielded religious comfort to a class of minds, and then I accused it of remoteness and sterility.  But so far as it affords such comfort, it surely is not sterile; it has that amount of value; it performs a concrete function.  As a good pragmatist, I myself ought to call the Absolute true ‘in so far forth,’ then; and I unhesitatingly now do so.

But what does true in so far forth mean in this case?  To answer, we need only apply the pragmatic method.  What do believers in the Absolute mean by saying that their belief affords them comfort?  They mean that since in the Absolute finite evil is ‘overruled’ already, we may, therefore, whenever we wish, treat the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can trust its outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of our finite responsibility.  In short, they mean that we have a right ever and anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and are none of our business.