Such is the reaction of an empiricist mind upon the rationalist bill of fare.  It is an absolute ‘No, I thank you.’  “Religion,” says Mr. Swift, “is like a sleep-walker to whom actual things are blank.”  And such, tho possibly less tensely charged with feeling, is the verdict of every seriously inquiring amateur in philosophy to-day who turns to the philosophy-professors for the wherewithal to satisfy the fulness of his nature’s needs.  Empiricist writers give him a materialism, rationalists give him something religious, but to that religion “actual things are blank.”  He becomes thus the judge of us philosophers.  Tender or tough, he finds us wanting.  None of us may treat his verdicts disdainfully, for after all, his is the typically perfect mind, the mind the sum of whose demands is greatest, the mind whose criticisms and dissatisfactions are fatal in the long run.

It is at this point that my own solution begins to appear.  I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand.  It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts.  I hope I may be able to leave many of you with as favorable an opinion of it as I preserve myself.  Yet, as I am near the end of my hour, I will not introduce pragmatism bodily now.  I will begin with it on the stroke of the clock next time.  I prefer at the present moment to return a little on what I have said.

If any of you here are professional philosophers, and some of you I know to be such, you will doubtless have felt my discourse so far to have been crude in an unpardonable, nay, in an almost incredible degree.  Tender-minded and tough-minded, what a barbaric disjunction!  And, in general, when philosophy is all compacted of delicate intellectualities and subtleties and scrupulosities, and when every possible sort of combination and transition obtains within its bounds, what a brutal caricature and reduction of highest things to the lowest possible expression is it to represent its field of conflict as a sort of rough-and-tumble fight between two hostile temperaments!  What a childishly external view!  And again, how stupid it is to treat the abstractness of rationalist systems as a crime, and to damn them because they offer themselves as sanctuaries and places of escape, rather than as prolongations of the world of facts.  Are not all our theories just remedies and places of escape?  And, if philosophy is to be religious, how can she be anything else than a place of escape from the crassness of reality’s surface?  What better thing can she do than raise us out of our animal senses and show us another and a nobler home for our minds in that great framework of ideal principles subtending all reality, which the intellect divines?  How can principles and general views ever be anything but abstract outlines?  Was Cologne cathedral built without an architect’s plan on paper?  Is refinement in itself an abomination?  Is concrete rudeness the only thing that’s true?