is made uncomfortable, or croaking when pressed in a particular spot.  If its spinal cord be severed, the lower limbs, disconnected from the brain, will also perform actions of this kind.  The question arises, Is the frog entirely a soulless automaton, performing all its actions directly in response to external stimuli, only more perfectly and with more delicate adjustment when its brain remains intact, or is its soul distributed along its spinal marrow, so that it can be divided into two parts independent of one another?

The professed metaphysician might perhaps tend to regard such consideration as irrelevant; but if the starting-point of metaphysics is to be found in psychology, psychology itself depends to no small extent upon physiology.  This question, however, Huxley did not pretend to solve.  In the existing state of knowledge he believed it to be insoluble.  But he thought it was not without its bearing upon the supposed relations of soul and body in the human subject, and should serve to give pause to current theories on the matter.

His third paper, read January 11, 1876, was on the “Evidence of the Miracle of the Resurrection,” in which he argued that there was no valid evidence of actual death having taken place.  His rejection of the miraculous had led to an invitation from some of his opponents in the society to write a paper on a definite miracle, and explain his reasons for not accepting it.  His choice of subject was due to two reasons:  firstly, it was a cardinal instance; secondly, it was a miracle not worked by Christ Himself, and therefore a discussion of its genuineness could offer no suggestion of personal fraud, and hence would avoid inflicting gratuitous pain upon believers in it.

This certainty that there exist many questions at present insoluble, upon which it is intellectually, and indeed morally wrong to assert that we have real knowledge, had long been with him, but, although he had earned abundant odium by openly resisting the claims of dogmatic authority, he had not been compelled to define his philosophical position until he entered the Metaphysical Society.  How he came to enrich the English language with the name “Agnostic” is explained in his article “Agnosticism” ("Collected Essays” 5 pages 237-239).

After describing how it came about that his mind] “steadily gravitated towards the conclusions of Hume and Kant,” [so well stated by the latter as follows:—­

The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure reason is, after all, merely negative, since it serves not as an organon for the enlargement (of knowledge), but as a discipline for its delimitation; and, instead of discovering truth, has only the modest merit of preventing error:—­

he proceeds:—­]