It is, more over, within the knowledge of such as are at all conversant with public affairs that schemes of internal improvement have from time to time been proposed which, from their extent and seeming magnificence, were readily regarded as of national concernment, but which upon fuller consideration and further experience would now be rejected with great unanimity.

That the plan under consideration would derive important advantages from its certainty, and that the moneys set apart for these purposes would be more judiciously applied and economically expended under the direction of the State legislatures, in which every part of each State is immediately represented, can not, I think, be doubted.  In the new States particularly, where a comparatively small population is scattered over an extensive surface, and the representation in Congress consequently very limited, it is natural to expect that the appropriations made by the Federal Government would be more likely to be expended in the vicinity of those numbers through whose immediate agency they were obtained than if the funds were placed under the control of the legislature, in which every county of the State has its own representative.  This supposition does not necessarily impugn the motives of such Congressional representatives, nor is it so intended.  We are all sensible of the bias to which the strongest minds and purest hearts are, under such circumstances, liable.  In respect to the last objection—­its probable effect upon the dignity and independence of State governments—­it appears to me only necessary to state the case as it is, and as it would be if the measure proposed were adopted, to show that the operation is most likely to be the very reverse of that which the objection supposes.

In the one case the State would receive its quota of the national revenue for domestic use upon a fixed principle as a matter of right, and from a fund to the creation of which it had itself contributed its fair proportion.  Surely there could be nothing derogatory in that.  As matters now stand the States themselves, in their sovereign character, are not unfrequently petitioners at the bar of the Federal Legislature for such allowances out of the National Treasury as it may comport with their pleasure or sense of duty to bestow upon them.  It can not require argument to prove which of the two courses is most compatible with the efficiency or respectability of the State governments.

But all these are matters for discussion and dispassionate consideration.  That the desired adjustment would be attended with difficulty affords no reason why it should not be attempted.  The effective operation of such motives would have prevented the adoption of the Constitution under which we have so long lived and under the benign influence of which our beloved country has so signally prospered.  The framers of that sacred instrument had greater difficulties to overcome, and they did overcome them.  The patriotism