We are also improving our tactical air forces, buying about 1700 new fighter and attack aircraft over the next five years, and increasing the number of Air Force fighter wings by over 10 percent.

We are working closely with our European allies to secure the Host Nation Support necessary to enable us to deploy more quickly a greater ratio of combat forces to the European theater at a lower cost to the United States.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

As we move to enhance U.S. defense capabilities, we must not lose sight of the need to assist others in maintaining their own security and independence.  Events since World War II, most recently in Southwest Asia, have amply demonstrated that U.S. security cannot exist in a vacuum, and that our own prospects for peace are closely tied to those of our friends.  The security assistance programs which I am proposing for the coming fiscal year thus directly promote vital U.S. foreign policy and national security aims, and are integral parts of our efforts to improve and upgrade our own military forces.

More specifically, these programs, which are part of our overall foreign aid request, promote U.S. security in two principal ways.  First, they assist friendly and allied nations to develop the capability to defend themselves and maintain their own independence.  An example during this past year was the timely support provided Thailand to help bolster that country’s defenses against the large numbers of Soviet-backed Vietnamese troops ranged along its eastern frontier.  In addition, over the years these programs have been important to the continued independence of other friends and allies such as Israel, Greece, Turkey and Korea.  Second, security assistance constitutes an essential element in the broad cooperative relationships we have established with many nations which permit either U.S. bases on their territory or access by U.S. forces to their facilities.  These programs have been particularly important with regard to the recently-concluded access agreements with various countries in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions and have been crucial to the protection of our interests throughout Southwest Asia.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES

We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened.

The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible:  They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support.  Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance.

Among the specific initiatives we are taking to help us respond to crises outside of Europe are: