Our new systems will enable U.S. strategic forces to maintain equivalence in the face of the mounting Soviet challenge.  We would however need an even greater investment in strategic systems to meet the likely Soviet buildup without salt.

STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

This Administration’s systematic contributions to the necessary evolution of strategic doctrine began in 1977 when I commissioned a comprehensive net assessment.  From that base a number of thorough investigations of specific topics continued.  I should emphasize that the need for an evolutionary doctrine is driven not by any change in our basic objective, which remains peace and freedom for all mankind.  Rather, the need for change is driven by the inexorable buildup of Soviet military power and the increasing propensity of Soviet leaders to use this power in coercion and outright aggression to impose their will on others.

I have codified our evolving strategic doctrine in a number of interrelated and mutually supporting Presidential Directives.  Their overarching theme is to provide a doctrinal basis, and the specific program to implement it, that tells the world that no potential adversary of the United States could ever conclude that the fruits of his aggression would be significant or worth the enormous costs of our retaliation.

The Presidential Directives include: 

PD-18:  An overview of our strategic objectives PD-37:  Basic space policy PD-41:  Civil Defense PD-53:  Survivability and endurance for telecommunications PD-57:  Mobilization planning PD-58:  Continuity of Government PD-59:  Countervailing Strategy for General War.

These policies have been devised to deter, first and foremost, Soviet aggression.  As such they confront not only Soviet military forces but also Soviet military doctrine.  By definition deterrence requires that we shape Soviet assessments about the risks of war, assessments they will make using their doctrine, not ours.

But at the same time we in no way seek to emulate their doctrine.  In particular, nothing in our policy contemplates that nuclear warfare could ever be a deliberate instrument for achieving our own goals of peace and freedom.  Moreover, our policies are carefully devised to provide the greatest possible incentives and opportunities for future progress in arms control.

Finally, our doctrinal evolution has been undertaken with appropriate consultation with our NATO Allies and others.  We are fully consistent with NATO’s strategy of flexible response.

FORCES FOR NATO

We are greatly accelerating our ability to reinforce Western Europe with massive ground and air forces in a crisis.  We are undertaking a major modernization program for the Army’s weapons and equipment, adding armor, firepower, and tactical mobility.

We are prepositioning more heavy equipment in Europe to help us cope with attacks with little warning, and greatly strengthening our airlift and sealift capabilities.