The first task of the alliance remains the common defense.  Last month Prime Minister Macmillan and I laid plans for a new stage in our long cooperative effort, one which aims to assist in the wider task of framing a common nuclear defense for the whole alliance.

The Nassau agreement recognizes that the security of the West is indivisible, and so must be our defense.  But it also recognizes that this is an alliance of proud and sovereign nations, and works best when we do not forget it.  It recognizes further that the nuclear defense of the West is not a matter for the present nuclear powers alone—­that France will be such a power in the future—­and that ways must be found without increasing the hazards of nuclear diffusion, to increase the role of our other partners in planning, manning, and directing a truly multilateral nuclear force within an increasingly intimate NATO alliance.  Finally, the Nassau agreement recognizes that nuclear defense is not enough, that the agreed NATO levels of conventional strength must be met, and that the alliance cannot afford to be in a position of having to answer every threat with nuclear weapons or nothing.

We remain too near the Nassau decisions, and too far from their full realization, to know their place in history.  But I believe that, for the first time, the door is open for the nuclear defense of the alliance to become a source of confidence, instead of a cause of contention.

The next most pressing concern of the alliance is our common economic goals of trade and growth.  This Nation continues to be concerned about its balance-of-payments deficit, which, despite its decline, remains a stubborn and troublesome problem.  We believe, moreover, that closer economic ties among all free nations are essential to prosperity and peace.  And neither we nor the members of the European Common Market are so affluent that we can long afford to shelter high cost farms or factories from the winds of foreign competition, or to restrict the channels of trade with other nations of the free world.  If the Common Market should move toward protectionism and restrictionism, it would undermine its own basic principles.  This Government means to use the authority conferred on it last year by the Congress to encourage trade expansion on both sides of the Atlantic and around the world.

V.

Second, what of the developing and non-aligned nations?  They were shocked by the Soviets’ sudden and secret attempt to transform Cuba into a nuclear striking base—­and by Communist China’s arrogant invasion of India.  They have been reassured by our prompt assistance to India, by our support through the United Nations of the Congo’s unification, by our patient search for disarmament, and by the improvement in our treatment of citizens and visitors whose skins do not happen to be white.  And as the older colonialism recedes, and the neo-colonialism of the Communist powers stands out more starkly than ever, they realize more clearly that the issue in the world struggle is not communism versus capitalism, but coercion versus free choice.