It does not seem that the authority to give advisory opinions interferes with the independence of the court.  Advisory opinions in and of themselves are not harmful, but may be used in such a way as to be very beneficial because they undertake to prevent injury rather than merely afford a remedy after the injury has been done.  As a principle that only implies that the court shall function when proper application is made to it.  Deciding the question involved upon issues submitted for an advisory opinion does not differ materially from deciding the question involved upon issues submitted by contending parties.  Up to the present time the court has given an advisory opinion when it judged it had jurisdiction, and refused to give one when it judged it did not have jurisdiction.  Nothing in the work of the court has yet been an indication that this is an impairment of its independence or that its practice differs materially from the giving of like opinions under the authority of the constitutions of several of our States.

No provision of the statute seems to me to give this court any authority to be a political rather than a judicial court.  We have brought cases in this country before our courts which, when they have been adjudged to be political, have been thereby dismissed.  It is not improbable that political questions will be submitted to this court, but again up to the present time the court has refused to pass on political questions and our support would undoubtedly have a tendency to strengthen it in that refusal.

We are not proposing to subject ourselves to any compulsory jurisdiction.  If we support the court, we can never be obliged to submit any case which involves our interests for its decision.  Our appearance before it would always be voluntary, for the purpose of presenting a case which we had agreed might be presented.  There is no more danger that others might bring cases before the court involving our interests which we did not wish to have brought, after we have adhered, and probably not so much, than there would be of bringing such cases if we do not adhere.  I think that we would have the same legal or moral right to disregard such a finding in the one case that we would in the other.

If we are going to support any court, it will not be one that we have set up alone or which reflects only our ideals.  Other nations have their customs and their institutions, their thoughts and their methods of life.  If a court is going to be international, its composition will have to yield to what is good in all these various elements.  Neither will it be possible to support a court which is exactly perfect, or under which we assume absolutely no obligations.  If we are seeking that opportunity, we might as well declare that we are opposed to supporting any court.  If any agreement is made, it will be because it undertakes to set up a tribunal which can do some of the things that other nations wish to have done.  We shall