If this full programme should be carried out we should have built or building in 1921, according to the estimates of survival and standards of classification followed by the General Board of the Department, an effective navy consisting of twenty-seven battleships of the first line, six battle cruisers, twenty-five battleships of the second line, ten armored cruisers, thirteen scout cruisers, five first class cruisers, three second class cruisers, ten third class cruisers, one hundred and eight destroyers, eighteen fleet submarines, one hundred and fifty-seven coast submarines, six monitors, twenty gunboats, four supply ships, fifteen fuel ships, four transports, three tenders to torpedo vessels, eight vessels of special types, and two ammunition ships.  This would be a navy fitted to our needs and worthy of our traditions.

But armies and instruments of war are only part of what has to be considered if we are to provide for the supreme matter of national self-sufficiency and security in all its aspects.  There are other great matters which will be thrust upon our attention whether we will or not.  There is, for example, a very pressing question of trade and shipping involved in this great problem of national adequacy.  It is necessary for many weighty reasons of national efficiency and development that we should have a great merchant marine.  The great merchant fleet we once used to make us rich, that great body of sturdy sailors who used to carry our flag into every sea, and who were the pride and often the bulwark of the nation, we have almost driven out of existence by inexcusable neglect and indifference and by a hopelessly blind and provincial policy of so-called economic protection.  It is high time we repaired our mistake and resumed our commercial independence on the seas.

For it is a question of independence.  If other nations go to war or seek to hamper each other’s commerce, our merchants, it seems, are at their mercy, to do with as they please.  We must use their ships, and use them as they determine.  We have not ships enough of our own.  We cannot handle our own commerce on the seas.  Our independence is provincial, and is only on land and within our own borders.  We are not likely to be permitted to use even the ships of other nations in rivalry of their own trade, and are without means to extend our commerce even where the doors are wide open and our goods desired.  Such a situation is not to be endured.  It is of capital importance not only that the United States should be its own carrier on the seas and enjoy the economic independence which only an adequate merchant marine would give it, but also that the American hemisphere as a whole should enjoy a like independence and self-sufficiency, if it is not to be drawn into the tangle of European affairs.  Without such independence the whole question of our political unity and self-determination is very seriously clouded and complicated indeed.