IV.

First, how fares the grand alliance?  Free Europe is entering into a new phase of its long and brilliant history.  The era of colonial expansion has passed; the era of national rivalries is fading; and a new era of interdependence and unity is taking shape.  Defying the old prophecies of Marx, consenting to what no conqueror could ever compel, the free nations of Europe are moving toward a unity of purpose and power and policy in every sphere of activity.

For 17 years this movement has had our consistent support, both political and economic.  Far from resenting the new Europe, we regard her as a welcome partner, not a rival.  For the road to world peace and freedom is still long, and there are burdens which only full partners can share—­in supporting the common defense, in expanding world trade, in aligning our balance of payments, in aiding the emergent nations, in concerting political and economic policies, and in welcoming to our common effort other industrialized nations, notably Japan, whose remarkable economic and political development of the 1950’s permits it now to play on the world scene a major constructive role.

No doubt differences of opinion will continue to get more attention than agreements on action, as Europe moves from independence to more formal interdependence.  But these are honest differences among honorable associates—­more real and frequent, in fact, among our Western European allies than between them and the United States.  For the unity of freedom has never relied on uniformity of opinion.  But the basic agreement of this alliance on fundamental issues continues.

The first task of the alliance remains the common defense.  Last month Prime Minister Macmillan and I laid plans for a new stage in our long cooperative effort, one which aims to assist in the wider task of framing a common nuclear defense for the whole alliance.

The Nassau agreement recognizes that the security of the West is indivisible, and so must be our defense.  But it also recognizes that this is an alliance of proud and sovereign nations, and works best when we do not forget it.  It recognizes further that the nuclear defense of the West is not a matter for the present nuclear powers alone—­that France will be such a power in the future—­and that ways must be found without increasing the hazards of nuclear diffusion, to increase the role of our other partners in planning, manning, and directing a truly multilateral nuclear force within an increasingly intimate NATO alliance.  Finally, the Nassau agreement recognizes that nuclear defense is not enough, that the agreed NATO levels of conventional strength must be met, and that the alliance cannot afford to be in a position of having to answer every threat with nuclear weapons or nothing.

We remain too near the Nassau decisions, and too far from their full realization, to know their place in history.  But I believe that, for the first time, the door is open for the nuclear defense of the alliance to become a source of confidence, instead of a cause of contention.