The administration is giving immediate increased attention to the development of additional Republic of Korea forces.  The citizens of that country have proved their capacity as fighting men and their eagerness to take a greater share in the defense of their homeland.  Organization, equipment, and training will allow them to do so.  Increased assistance to Korea for this purpose conforms fully to our global policies.

In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea, the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland.

This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.  Regardless of the situation in 1950, since the date of that order the Chinese Communists have invaded Korea to attack the United Nations forces there.  They have consistently rejected the proposals of the United Nations Command for an armistice.  They recently joined with Soviet Russia in rejecting the armistice proposal sponsored in the United Nations by the Government of India.  This proposal had been accepted by the United States and 53 other nations.

Consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists, thus permitting those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China.  This order implies no aggressive intent on our part.  But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.

IV.

Our labor for peace in Korea and in the world imperatively demands the maintenance by the United States of a strong fighting service ready for any contingency.

Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy.  To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another.

Both military and economic objectives demand a single national military policy, proper coordination of our armed services, and effective consolidation of certain logistics activities.

We must eliminate waste and duplication of effort in the armed services.

We must realize clearly that size alone is not sufficient.  The biggest force is not necessarily the best—­and we want the best.

We must not let traditions or habits of the past stand in the way of developing an efficient military force.  All members of our forces must be ever mindful that they serve under a single flag and for a single cause.