The court appears to be independent of the league.  It is true the judges are elected by the Assembly and Council, but they are nominated by the Court of Arbitration, which we assisted to create and of which we are a part.  The court was created by it statute, so-called, which is really a treaty made among some forty-eight different countries, that might properly be called a constitution of the court.  This statute provides a method by which the judges are chosen so that when the Court of Arbitration nominates them and the Assembly and Council of the League elect them, they are not acting as instruments of the Court of Arbitration or instruments of the league, but as instruments of the statute.

This will be even more apparent if our representatives sit with the members of the council and assembly in electing the judges.  It is true they are paid through the league though not by the league, but by the countries which are members of the league and by our country if we accept the protocol.  The judges are paid by the league only in the same sense that it could be said United States judges are paid by the Congress.  The court derives all its authority from the statute and is so completely independent of the league that it could go on functioning if the league were disbanded, at least until the terms of the judges expired.

The most careful provisions are made in the statute as to the qualifications of judges.  Those who make the nominations are recommended to consult with their highest court of justice, their law schools and academies.  The judges must be persons of high moral character, qualified to hold the highest judicial offices in that country, or be jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.  It must be assumed that these requirements will continue to be carefully met, and with America joining the countries already concerned it is difficult to comprehend how human ingenuity could better provide for the establishment of a court which would maintain its independence.  It has to be recognized that independence is to a considerable extent a matter of ability, character, and personality.  Some effort was made in the early beginnings to interfere with the independence of our Supreme Court.  It did not succeed because of the quality of the men who made up that tribunal.

It does not seem that the authority to give advisory opinions interferes with the independence of the court.  Advisory opinions in and of themselves are not harmful, but may be used in such a way as to be very beneficial because they undertake to prevent injury rather than merely afford a remedy after the injury has been done.  As a principle that only implies that the court shall function when proper application is made to it.  Deciding the question involved upon issues submitted for an advisory opinion does not differ materially from deciding the question involved upon issues submitted by contending parties.  Up to the present time the court has given an advisory opinion when it judged it had jurisdiction, and refused to give one when it judged it did not have jurisdiction.  Nothing in the work of the court has yet been an indication that this is an impairment of its independence or that its practice differs materially from the giving of like opinions under the authority of the constitutions of several of our States.