became even less pronounced, and at a radius of twenty miles all the Sheikhs oscillated alternately between Osman Digna and the Egyptian Government, and tried to avoid open hostilities with either.  Omar Tita, Sheikh of the district round about Erkowit, found himself situated on this fringe of intriguing neutrality.  Although he was known to have dealings with Osman, it was believed that if he had the power to choose he would side with the Egyptian Government.  Early in April Omar Tita reported that Osman Digna was in the neighbourhood of Erkowit with a small force, and that he, the faithful ally of the Government, had on the 3rd of the month defeated him with a loss of four camels.  He also said that if the Egyptian Government would send up a force to fight Osman, he, the aforesaid ally, would keep him in play until it arrived.

After a few days of hesitation and telegraphic communication with the Sirdar, Colonel Lloyd, the Governor of Suakin, who was then in very bad health, decided that he had not enough troops to justify him in taking the risk of going up to Erkowit to fight Osman.  Around Suakin, as along the Indian frontier, a battle was always procurable on the shortest notice.  When a raid has taken place, the Government may choose the scale of their reprisals.  If they are poor, they will arrange a counter-raid by means of ‘friendlies,’ and nothing more will be heard of the affair.  If they are rich, they will mobilise two or three brigades, and make an expedition or fight a pitched battle, so that another glory may be added to the annals of the British army.  In the present instance the Egyptian Government were poor, and as the British Government did not desire to profit by the opportunity it was determined to have only a small-scale operation.  The Governor therefore arranged a plan for a demonstration at the foot of the hills near Khor Wintri by means of combined movements from Suakin and Tokar.  The garrison of Suakin consisted of the 1st and half the 5th Egyptian Battalions; the 16th Egyptian reservists, who had just replaced the IXth Soudanese, and were as yet hardly formed into a military body; one squadron of cavalry, one company of Camel Corps, and some detachments of artillery.  The garrison of Tokar consisted of the Xth Soudanese and a few gunners.  From these troops there was organised in the second week in April, with all due ceremony, a ‘Suakin Field Force.’

The plan of campaign was simple.  Colonel Lloyd was to march out from Suakin and effect a junction with the ‘Tokar Column’ at Khor Wintri, where the Erkowit road enters the hills.  It was then hoped that Osman Digna would descend and fight a battle of the required dimensions in the open; after which, if victorious, the force would return to Suakin and Tokar.

In order to make the Suakin Column as mobile as possible, the whole force was mounted on camels, of which more than 1,000 were requisitioned, as well as 60 mules and 120 donkeys.  Two hundred Arabs accompanied the column to hold these beasts when necessary.  Six days’ forage and rations, one day’s reserve of water, 200 rounds per man, and 100 shell per gun were carried.  At five o’clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 14th of April, the troops paraded outside the walls of Suakin, and bivouacked in the open ready to march at daylight.