The reports of the spies were at length confirmed and amplified by two most important witnesses.  At the end of 1891 Father Ohrwalder made his escape from Omdurman and reached the Egyptian territory.  Besides giving the Intelligence Department much valuable information, he published a thrilling account of his captivity [ten years’ captivity, Father Ohrwalder], which created a wide and profound impression in England.  In 1895 a still more welcome fugitive reached Assuan.  Early on the 16th of March a weary, travel-stained Arab, in a tattered jibba and mounted on a lame and emaciated camel, presented himself to the Commandant.  He was received with delighted wonder, and forthwith conducted to the best bath-room available.  Two hours later a little Austrian gentleman stepped forth, and the telegraph hastened to tell the news that Slatin, sometime Governor of Darfur, had escaped from the Khalifa’s clutches.  Here at last was a man who knew everything that concerned the Dervish Empire—­Slatin, the Khalifa’s trusted and confidential servant, almost his friend, who had lived with him, who was even permitted to dine with him alone, who had heard all his counsels, who knew all his Emirs, and moreover Slatin, the soldier and administrator, who could appreciate all he had learned, was added with the rank of Pasha to the Staff of the Intelligence Department.  While his accurate knowledge confirmed the belief of the Egyptian authorities that the Dervish power was declining, his tale of ‘Fire and Sword in the Soudan’ increased the horror and anger of thoughtful people in England at the cruelties of the Khalifa.  Public opinion began to veer towards the policy of re-conquest.

The year 1895 brought in a Conservative and Unionist Administration.  A Government came into office supported by a majority which was so strong that there seemed little reason to expect a transference of power for five or six years.  Ministers were likely to be able to carry to a definite conclusion any projects they might devise.  They belonged chiefly to that party in the State which had consistently assailed Mr. Gladstone’s Egyptian policy.  Here was an opportunity of repairing the damage done by their opponents.  The comparisons that would follow such an accomplishment were self-evident and agreeable even to anticipate.  The idea of re-conquering the Soudan presented itself indefinitely, but not unpleasingly, alike to the Government and the people of Great Britain.  The unforeseen course of events crystallised the idea into a policy.

On the 1st of March, 1896, the battle of Adowa was fought, and Italy at the hands of Abyssinia sustained a crushing defeat.  Two results followed which affected other nations.  First, a great blow had been struck at European prestige in North Africa.  It seemed probable that the Abyssinian success would encourage the Dervishes to attack the Italians at Kassala.  It was possible that they might also attack the Egyptians at Suakin or on the Wady Halfa frontier.  Secondly, the value of Italy as a factor in European politics was depreciated.  The fact that her defeat had been assisted by the arms and munitions of war which had been supplied to the Abyssinians from French and Russian sources complicated the situation.  The Triple Alliance was concerned.  The third partner had been weakened.  The balance might be restored if Great Britain would make some open sign of sympathy.