responsibility and more danger, he harried and raided the surrounding tribes; he restricted and almost destroyed the slender trade which was again springing up, and in consequence of his measures the neighbourhood of Suakin was soon in even greater ferment than usual.  This culminated at the end of 1887 in the re-appearance and advance of Osman Digna.  The movements of the Dervishes were, however, uncertain.  The defences of the town had been greatly strengthened and improved by the skill and activity of its new Governor. [See dispatch from Major-General Dormer to War Office, Cairo, April 22, 1888:  ’With regard to the military works and defenses of the town, I was much struck with the great improvement that has been effected by Colonel Kitchener since my last visit to Suakin in the autumn of 1884.] Osman Digna retreated.  The ‘friendlies’ were incited to follow, and Kitchener, although he had been instructed not to employ British officers or Egyptian regulars in offensive operations, went out in support.  At Handub on the morning of the 17th of January, 1888, the friendlies attacked the camp of Osman Digna.  They were at first successful; but while they dispersed to plunder the enemy rallied and, returning, drove them back with loss.  Kitchener arrived on the field with the support, to find a defeat instead of a victory awaiting him.  He bravely endeavoured to cover the retreat of the friendlies, and in so doing was severely—­as it first seemed dangerously—­wounded in the jaw.  The loss among the friendlies and the support amounted to twenty men killed and two British officers and twenty-eight men wounded.  The Governor returned in great pain and some discomfiture to Suakin.  In spite of his wound and his reverse he was impatient to renew the conflict, but this was definitely forbidden by the British Government.  Colonel Kitchener’s military conduct was praised, but his policy was prevented.  ’The policy which it is desirable to follow . . . in the Eastern Soudan,’ wrote Sir Evelyn Baring on the 17th of March, in measured rebuke, ’should consist in standing purely on the defensive against any hostile movement or combination of the Arab tribes, in avoiding any course of action which might involve the ultimate necessity of offensive action, and in encouraging legitimate trade by every means in our power.’ [Sir E. Baring to Consul Cameron, March 14, 1888.]

The Governor could scarcely be expected to carry out a policy so much at variance with his views and inclinations, and in the summer of 1888 he was transferred to a purely military appointment and became Adjutant-General of the Egyptian army.  For the next four years he worked busily in the War Office at Cairo, effecting many useful reforms and hard economies, and revealing powers of organisation which, although not yet appreciated by his comrades in the Egyptian service, were noticed by one vigilant eye.  In 1892 Sir F. Grenfell resigned the post of Sirdar, and the chief command of the Egyptian army was vacant.  Two men stood