It is usual to look upon Mr. Gladstone’s conduct in the matter of the relief of Gordon as dictated by benevolent weakness.  History may take another view.  Strong and stubborn as was the character of the General, that of the Minister was its equal.  If Gordon was the better man, Gladstone was incomparably the greater.  It was easy for the First Minister of the Crown to despatch an expedition against savages.  He was accustomed to the exercise of power.  Compared with the resources of the Empire, the enterprise was insignificant.  Few men have feared responsibility less than Gladstone.  On the other hand, the expressed desire of the nation was a force to which he had always bowed—­to which, indeed, he owed his political existence.  Yet, in spite of the growing agitation throughout the land, he remained stern and silent.  Most men do what is right, or what they persuade themselves is right; nor is it difficult to believe that Mr. Gladstone did not feel justified in involving the nation in operations in the heart of the Soudan for the purpose, not of saving the life of the envoy—­for Gordon had but to embark on his steamers and come home—­but simply in order to vindicate the personal honour of a man.  And it is possible that a feeling of resentment against the officer whose intractable nature was bringing such odium upon the Government may have coloured his resolution with a darker tinge.

But for all his power and influence he was forced to give way.  The Government which had long ignored the call of honour abroad, was driven to the Soudan by the cries of shame at home.  Lord Hartington, at that time Secretary of State for War, must be dissociated from the general censure which his principal colleagues have incurred.  He was the first to recognise the obligation which lay upon the Cabinet, and through the Cabinet upon the nation, and it was to his influence that the despatch of the relieving expedition was mainly due.  The Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant-General, who were fully alive to the critical position at Khartoum, added their recommendations.  But even at the last moment Mr. Gladstone was induced to sanction the advance only by the belief that the scale of the operations would be small, and that only a single brigade would be necessary.  The decision was taken forthwith by the Ministry and announced to the nation.  The Adjutant-General, however, asked for a very different force from what the Government had anticipated, and the single brigade was expanded into an expedition of ten thousand men, selected from the whole army.

To reverse the decision was now, however, impossible, and the ’Gordon Relief Expedition’ began.  The commander to whom the conduct of the operations had been entrusted reviewed the situation.  He saw himself confronted with a task which was easy and safe if it were undertaken at leisure, and which was doubtful and perilous if begun in haste.  All the fruits of a long and successful career were staked on the result, and it is scarcely wonderful that he declined to be swift and reckless.  Shrewdly estimating the military difficulties, he made his plans for a methodical and deliberate advance which would leave nothing to luck, and which resembles in character that afterwards carried out by Sir H. Kitchener.  He excluded the idea of a wild glorious rush which might result in astonishing success or terrible disaster.