Slatin’s position, it should be observed, was not that of an officer released on parole, but of a prisoner of war in durance in the enemy’s camp.  In such circumstances he was clearly entitled to escape at his own proper risk.  If his captors gave him the chance, they had only themselves to blame.  His position was not dissimilar from that of the black soldiers who had been captured by the Dervishes and were now made to serve against the Government.  These deserted to Khartoum daily, and the General fully acquiesced in their doing so.  As to Slatin’s escape affecting the treatment of the other European prisoners, it must be observed that when at various times escapes were effected from Omdurman, and ultimately when Slatin himself escaped, no ill-treatment was inflicted on the rest of the prisoners; and even had such ill-treatment been the certain consequence of an escape, that need not have debarred a man, according to the customs of war, from attempting to regain his liberty.  Nothing but his free and formal promise, obtained in return for favours received, can alienate that right.  If the Mahdi chose to slaughter the remaining prisoners, the responsibility rested with the Mahdi.

Slatin was, however, in no position to argue his case.  His correspondence with Gordon was discovered.  For some days his life hung on a thread.  For several months he was heavily chained and fed on a daily handful of uncooked doura, such as is given to horses and mules.  Tidings of these things were carried to Gordon.  ‘Slatin,’ he observes icily, ’is still in chains.’  He never doubted the righteousness of the course he had adopted, never for an instant.  But few will deny that there were strong arguments on both sides.  Many will assert that they were nicely balanced.  Gordon must have weighed them carefully.  He never wavered.  Yet he needed Slatin.  He was alone.  He had no one in whose military capacity he could put the slightest confidence.  Again and again in the Journals he expresses his want of trustworthy subordinates.  He could not be everywhere, he said.  ’Nearly every order has to be repeated two or three times.  I am weary of my life.’  ’What one has felt so much here is the want of men like Gessi, or Messadaglia, or Slatin, but I have no one to whom I could entrust expeditions. . . . .’

This was the man who would have employed Zubehr and bowed to expediency.  But Zubehr had never ‘denied his Lord.’

The actual defence of Khartoum is within the province of the Journals, nor shall I attempt a chronological account.  After the 1Oth of September, when General Gordon sent Colonel Stewart and Messrs. Power and Herbin down the river in the ill-fated Abbas steamer, he was altogether alone.  Many men have bowed to the weight of responsibility.  Gordon’s responsibility was undivided.  There was no one to whom he could talk as an equal.  There was no one to whom he could—­as to a trusty subordinate—­reveal his doubts.  To some minds the exercise of power