With their refusal to allow Zubehr to go to the Soudan began the long and miserable disagreement between the Government and their envoy.  Puzzled and disturbed at the reception accorded to his first request, Gordon cast about for other expedients.  He had already stated that Zubehr was ‘the only chance.’  But it is the duty of subordinates to suggest other courses when those they recommend are rejected; and with a whole-hearted enthusiasm and unreserved loyalty the General threw himself into the affair and proposed plan after plan with apparent hope.

Gordon considered that he was personally pledged to effect the evacuation of Khartoum by the garrison and civil servants.  He had appointed some of the inhabitants to positions of trust, thus compromising them with the Mahdi.  Others had undoubtedly been encouraged to delay their departure by his arrival.  He therefore considered that his honour was involved in their safety.  Henceforward he was inflexible.  Neither rewards nor threats could move him.  Nothing that men could offer would induce him to leave Khartoum till its inhabitants were rescued.  The Government on their side were equally stubborn.  Nothing, however sacred, should induce them to send troops to Khartoum, or in any way involve themselves in the middle of Africa.  The town might fall; the garrison might be slaughtered; their envoy—­But what possibilities they were prepared to face as regards him will not be known until all of this and the next generation are buried and forgotten.

The deadlock was complete.  To some men the Foreign Office might have suggested lines of retreat, covered by the highest official praise, and leading to preferment and reward.  Others would have welcomed an order to leave so perilous a post.  But the man they had sent was the one man of all others who was beyond their control, who cared nothing for what they could give or take away.  So events dragged on their wretched course.  Gordon’s proposals became more and more impracticable as the best courses he could devise were successively vetoed by the Government, and as his irritation and disappointment increased.  The editor of his Journals has enumerated them with indignant care.  He had asked for Zubehr.  Zubehr was refused.  He had requested Turkish troops.  Turkish troops were refused.  He had asked for Mohammedan regiments from India.  The Government regretted their inability to comply.  He asked for a Firman from the Sultan to strengthen his position.  It was ‘peremptorily refused.’  He proposed to go south in his steamers to Equatoria.  The Government forbade him to proceed beyond Khartoum.  He asked that 200 British troops might be sent to Berber.  They were refused.  He begged that a few might be sent to Assuan.  None were sent.  He proposed to visit the Mahdi himself and try to arrange matters with him personally.  Perhaps he recognised a kindred spirit.  The Government in this case very naturally forbade him.