nothing could exceed the vigour with which the demand was made.  On the 1st of March General Gordon telegraphed:  ’I tell you plainly, it is impossible to get Cairo employees out of Khartoum unless the Government helps in the way I told you.  They refuse Zubehr . . . . but it was the only chance.’  And again on the 8th:  ’If you do not send Zubehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away.’  ‘I believe,’ said Sir Evelyn Baring in support of these telegrams, ’that General Gordon is quite right when he says that Zubehr Pasha is the only possible man.  Nubar is strongly in favour of him.  Dr. Bohndorf, the African traveller, fully confirms what General Gordon says of the influence of Zubehr.’  The Pasha was vile, but indispensable.

Her Majesty’s Government refused absolutely to have anything to do with Zubehr.  They declined to allow the Egyptian Government to employ him.  They would not entertain the proposal, and scarcely consented to discuss it.  The historians of the future may occupy their leisure and exercise their wits in deciding whether the Ministers and the people were right or wrong; whether they had a right to indulge their sensitiveness at so terrible a cost; whether they were not more nice than wise; whether their dignity was more offended by what was incurred or by what was avoided.

General Gordon has explained his views very clearly and concisely:  ’Had Zubehr Pasha been sent up when I asked for him, Berber would in all probability never have fallen, and one might have made a Soudan Government in opposition to the Mahdi.  We choose to refuse his coming up because of his antecedents in re slave trade; granted that we had reason, yet, as we take no precautions as to the future of these lands with respect to the slave trade, the above opposition seems absurd.  I will not send up ‘A’ because he will do this, but I will leave the country to ‘B’, who will do exactly the same [Major-General Gordon, journals at Khartoum.]

But if the justice of the decision is doubtful, its consequences were obvious.  Either the British Government were concerned with the Soudan, or they were not.  If they were not, then they had no reason or right to prohibit the appointment of Zubehr.  If they were, they were bound to see that the garrisons were rescued.  It was an open question whether Great Britain was originally responsible for the safety of the garrisons.  General Gordon contended that we were bound to save them at all costs, and he backed his belief with his life.  Others may hold that Governments have no right to lay, or at any rate must be very judicious in the laying of burdens on the backs of their own countrymen in order that they may indulge a refined sense of chivalry towards foreigners.  England had not misgoverned the Soudan, had not raised the revolt or planted the garrisons.  All that Egypt had a right to expect was commiseration.  But the moment Zubehr was prohibited the situation was changed.  The refusal to permit his employment was tantamount to an admission that affairs in the Soudan involved the honour of England as well as the honour of Egypt.  When the British people—­for this was not merely the act of the Government—­adopted a high moral attitude with regard to Zubehr, they bound themselves to rescue the garrisons, peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary.