Throughout this chapter it will be seen that the desire to get out of the country at once is the keynote of the British policy.  Every act, whether of war or administration, is intended to be final.  Every despatch is directed to breaking the connection between the two countries and winding up the severed strings.  But responsibilities which had been lightly assumed clung like the shirt of Nessus.  The ordinary practice of civilised nations demanded that some attempt should be made to justify interference by reorganisation.  The British Government watched therefore with anxious solicitude the efforts of Egypt to evacuate the Soudan and bring the garrisons safely home.  They utterly declined to assist with military force, but they were generous with their advice.  Everybody at that time distrusted the capacities of the Egyptians, and it was thought the evacuation might be accomplished if it were entrusted to stronger and more honest men than were bred by the banks of the Nile.  The Ministers looked about them, wondering how they could assist the Egyptian Government without risk or expense to themselves, and in an evil hour for their fame and fortunes someone whispered the word ‘Gordon.’  Forthwith they proceeded to telegraph to Cairo:  ’Would General Charles Gordon be of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government; and, if so, in what capacity’?  The Egyptian Government replied through Sir Evelyn Baring that as the movement in the Soudan was partly religious they were ‘very much averse’ from the appointment of a Christian in high command.  The eyes of all those who possessed local knowledge were turned to a different person.  There was one man who might stem the tide of Mahdism, who might perhaps restore the falling dominion of Egypt, who might at least save the garrisons of the Soudan.  In their necessity and distress the Khedivial advisers and the British plenipotentiary looked as a desperate remedy to the man whose liberty they had curtailed, whose property they had confiscated, and whose son they had executed—­Zubehr Pasha.

This was the agent for whom the Government of Egypt hankered.  The idea was supported by all who were acquainted with the local conditions.  A week after Sir Evelyn Baring had declined General Gordon’s services he wrote:  ’Whatever may be Zubehr’s faults, he is said to be a man of great energy and resolution.  The Egyptian Government considers that his services may be very useful. . . .  Baker Pasha is anxious to avail himself of Zubehr Pasha’s services.’[Sir Evelyn Baring, letter of December 9, 1883.] It is certain that had the Egyptian Government been a free agent, Zubehr would have been sent to the Soudan as its Sultan, and assisted by arms, money, and perhaps by men, to make head against the Mahdi.  It is probable that at this particular period the Mahdi would have collapsed before a man whose fame was nearly equal to, and whose resources would have been much greater than, his own.  But the British Ministry would countenance no dealings with such a man.  They scouted the idea of Zubehr, and by so doing increased their obligation to suggest an alternative.  Zubehr being rejected, Gordon remained.  It is scarcely possible to conceive a greater contrast than that which these two men presented.  It was a leap from the Equator to the North Pole.