The 3rd of April was the last day the army spent at Ras-el-Hudi.  The period of waiting was over.  The enemy’s position had been duly reconnoitred.  His strength was believed to be sufficiently impaired for a successful attack to be made.  The camp at Hudi was becoming very insanitary.  Moreover, the situation, satisfactory though it was, was not one which the commander could view without anxiety.  All the time that the army was operating on the Atbara it drew its supplies from the fort at the confluence.  Between this and the camp, convoys, protected only by a handful of Camel Corps, passed once in every four days.  Only the idiotic apathy of the Dervishes allowed the communications to remain uninterrupted.  Mahmud was strong in cavalry.  It will be evident to anyone who looks at the map how easily a force might have moved along the left bank to attack the convoys.  Such tactics would have occurred to most savage tribes.  But in their last campaigns the Dervishes thought only of battles, and disregarded all smaller enterprises.  Had they assailed the communications, the Sirdar might have been forced to build a chain of forts and to guard his convoys with strong infantry escorts.  The fighting force would have been weakened, the troops have been wearied, and the result must have been delayed.  The Dervishes had as yet attempted nothing.  But there was no reason why they should not at any moment become enterprising.  It was time to make an end.  On the 4th of April the whole force moved to Abadar, and established themselves in a new camp five miles nearer the enemy.  The tiger was tired of watching:  he had taken his first stride towards his prey.

Although the information as to the enemy’s strength and position was accurate and complete, the Sirdar decided to order a final reconnaissance on the 5th of April.

Starting at four o’clock Broadwood cut off the sharp angle which the Atbara forms at Umdabia, and, avoiding the thick bush, soon approached the Dervish camp.  Not a sign of the enemy was seen during the march.  The bush by the Atbara appeared deserted.  The camp gave no sign of life; an ominous silence prevailed.  The squadrons moved forward at a walk, keeping about 1,200 yards away from the enemy’s zeriba and almost parallel to it.  Presently, as they did so, a large force of cavalry became visible in front.  It was difficult to estimate their strength, but they appeared to be superior in numbers to the reconnaissance.  The Dervish horsemen continued to retire towards the south-east, always reaching round the Egyptian left flank.

And while the Egyptian force advanced, as soon as they were opposite the southern end of the zeriba, another considerable body of Dervish horse issued from the northern side and threatened the line of retreat.  At the same time the camp began to swarm with men, and crowds of tiny figures were observed clambering on to the entrenchments and gun emplacements, eagerly watching the development of the fight.  The cavalry had by this time approached to within 1,000 yards of the zeriba, and the Arab artillery began to fire occasional round shot and clumsily fused shells.