It seemed to those who were acquainted with the Dervish movements that all offensive operations on their part had been definitely abandoned.  Even in the Intelligence Department it was believed that the break-up of the Kerreri camp was the end of the Khalifa’s determination to move north.  There would be a hot and uneventful summer, and with the flood Nile the expedition would begin its final advance.  The news which was received on the 15th of February came as a great and pleasant surprise.  Mahmud was crossing the Nile and proposed to advance on Berber without reinforcements of any kind.  The Sirdar, highly satisfied at this astounding piece of good fortune, immediately began to mass his force nearer the confluence.  On the 21st the British at Abu Dis were instructed to hold themselves in readiness.  The Seaforths began their journey from Cairo, and the various battalions of the Egyptian army pressed forward towards Berber and Atbara fort.  On the 25th, Mahmud being reported as having crossed to the right bank, the general concentration was ordered.

CHAPTER XI:  RECONNAISSANCE

Although the story of a campaign is made up of many details which cannot be omitted, since they are essential to the truth as well as the interest of the account, it is of paramount importance that the reader should preserve throughout a general idea.  For otherwise the marches, forays, and reconnaissance will seem disconnected and purposeless affairs, and the battle simply a greater operation undertaken in the same haphazard fashion.  To appreciate the tale it is less necessary to contemplate the wild scenes and stirring incidents, than thoroughly to understand the logical sequence of incidents which all tend to and ultimately culminate in a decisive trial of strength.

The hazards which were courted by the daring occupation of Berber have been discussed in the last chapter.  From October to December the situation was threatening.  In December it suddenly became critical.  Had the Emir Mahmud advanced with the Dervishes at Metemma even as late as the middle of January, he might possibly have re-captured Berber.  If the great Omdurman army had taken the field, the possibility would have become a certainty.  The young Kordofan general saw his opportunity, and begged to be allowed to seize it.  But it was not until the Khalifa had sent his own army back into the city that, being very badly informed of the numbers and disposition of the Egyptian force, he allowed the Metemma Dervishes to move.

Mahmud received permission to advance at the end of January.  He eagerly obeyed the longed-for order.  But the whole situation was now changed.  The Egyptian army was concentrated; the British brigade had arrived; the railway had reached Geneinetti; the miserable hamlet of Dakhila, at the confluence, had grown from a small depot to a fort, and from a fort to an entrenched camp, against which neither Dervish