These bold fellows pushed on recklessly, and found the inhabitants everywhere terrified or acquiescent.  Spreading extraordinary tales of the strength of the army who were following them, they created a panic all along the river, and, in spite of a sharp fight with a Dervish patrol, reached Berber on the 31st.  As there was no armed force in the town, the enterprising allies rode into the streets and occupied the grain store—­the only public building—­in the name of the Government.  They then sent word back to Abu Hamed of what they had done, and sat down in the town, thus audaciously captured, to await developments.

The astonishing news of the fall of Berber reached General Hunter on the 2nd of September.  He immediately telegraphed to Merawi.  Sir Herbert Kitchener was confronted with a momentous question:  should Berber be occupied or not?  It may at first seem that there could be little doubt about the matter.  The objective of the expedition was Omdurman.  The occupation of Berber by an Egyptian garrison would settle at once the difficulties near Suakin.  The town was believed to be on the clear waterway to the Dervish capital.  The moral effect of its capture upon the riverain tribes and throughout the Soudan would be enormous.  Berber was, in fact, the most important strategic point on the whole line of advance.  This great prize and advantage was now to be had for the asking.

The opposite considerations were, however, tremendous.  Abu Hamed marked a definite stage in the advance.  As long as Merawi and the other posts in Dongola were strongly held, the line from Abu Hamed to Debba was capable of easy defence.  Abu Hamed could soon be made impregnable to Dervish attack.  The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on any threatened point.  At this moment in the campaign it was possible to stop and wait with perfect safety.  In the meantime the Khalifa would steadily weaken and the railway might steadily grow.  When the line reached the angle of the river, it would be time to continue the systematic and cautious advance.  Until then prudence and reason counselled delay.  To occupy Berber was to risk much.  Mahmud, with a large and victorious army, lay at Metemma.  Osman Digna, with 2,000 men, held Adarama almost within striking distance.  The railway still lagged in the desert.  The Dongola garrisons must be weakened to provide a force for Berber.  The Dervishes had the advantage of occupying the interior of the angle which the Nile forms at Abu Hamed.  The troops in Berber would have to draw their supplies by a long and slender line of camel communication, winding along all the way from Merawi, and exposed, as a glance at the map will show, throughout its whole length to attack.  More than all this:  to advance to Berber must inevitably force the development of the whole war.  The force in the town would certainly have its communications threatened, would probably have to fight for its very existence.  The occupation of Berber would involve