In order that the divine favour might be assisted by human effort, Abdullah adopted every measure or precaution that energy or prudence could suggest.  At first he seems to have apprehended that the Sirdar’s army would advance at once upon Omdurman, following the route of the Desert Column in 1885 from Korti to Metemma.  He therefore ordered Osman Azrak—­ in spite of his severe wound—­to hold Abu Klea Wells with the survivors of his flag.  Bishara, who had rallied and reorganised the remains of the Dongola army, was instructed to occupy Metemma, the headquarters of the Jaalin.  Messengers were despatched to the most distant garrisons to arrange for a general concentration upon Omdurman.  The Emir Ibrahim Khalil was recalled from the Ghezira, or the land between the Blue and White Niles, and with his force of about 4,000 Jehadia and Baggara soon reached the city.  Another chief, Ahmed Fedil, who was actually on his way to Gedaref, was ordered to return to the capital.  Thither also Osman Digna repaired from Adarama.  But it appears that the Khalifa only required the advice of that wily councillor, for he did not reduce the number of Dervishes in the small forts along the line of the Atbara—­Ed Darner, Adarama, Asubri, El Fasher—­and after a short visit and a long consultation Osman Digna returned to his post at Adarama.  Last of all, but not least in importance, Mahmud, who commanded the ‘Army of the West,’ was ordered to leave very reduced garrisons in Kordofan and Darfur, and march with his whole remaining force, which may have numbered 10,000 fighting men, to the Nile, and so to Omdurman.  Mahmud, who was as daring and ambitious as he was conceited and incapable, received the summons with delight, and began forthwith to collect his troops.

The Khalifa saw very clearly that he could not trust the riverain tribes.  The Jaalin and Barabra were discontented.  He knew that they were weary of his rule and of war.  In proportion as the Egyptian army advanced, so their loyalty and the taxes they paid decreased.  He therefore abandoned all idea of making a stand at Berber.  The Emir Yunes—­who, since he had been transferred from Dongola in 1895, had ruled the district—­was directed to collect all the camels, boats, grain, and other things that might assist an invading army and send them to Metemma.  The duty was most thoroughly performed.  The inhabitants were soon relieved of all their property and of most of their means of livelihood, and their naturally bitter resentment at this merciless treatment explains to some extent the astonishing events which followed the capture of Abu Hamed.  This last place Abdullah never regarded as more than an outpost.  Its garrison was not large, and although it had now become the most northerly Dervish position, only a slender reinforcement was added to the force under the command of Mohammed-ez-Zein.