transport to some point on the Nile whence there was a clear waterway was therefore imperative.  Berber and Metemma were known, and Abu Hamed was believed, to fulfil this condition.  But both Berber and Metemma were important strategic points.  It was improbable that the Dervishes would abandon these keys to Khartoum and the Soudan without severe resistance.  It seemed likely, indeed, that the Khalifa would strongly reinforce both towns, and desperately contest their possession.  The deserts between Korti and Metemma, and between Suakin and Berber, contained scattered wells, and small raiding parties might have cut the railway and perhaps have starved the army at its head.  It was therefore too dangerous to project the railway towards either Berber or Metemma until they were actually in our hands.  The argument is circular.  The towns could not be taken without a strong force; so strong a force could not advance until the railway was made; and the railway could not be made till the towns were taken.

Both the Korti-Metemma and the Suakin-Berber routes were therefore rejected.  The resolution to exclude the latter was further strengthened by the fact that the labour of building a railway over the hills behind Suakin would have been very great.

The route via Abu Hamed was selected by the exclusion of the alternatives.  But it had distinct and apparent advantages.  Abu Hamed was within striking distance of the army at Merawi.  It was not a point essential to the Dervish defences, and not, therefore, likely to be so strongly garrisoned as Berber or Metemma.  It might, therefore, be captured by a column marching along the river, and sufficiently small to be equipped with only camel transport.  The deserts through which the railway to Abu Hamed would pass contain few wells, and therefore it would be difficult for small raiding parties to cut the line or attack the construction gangs; and before the line got within reach of the Dervish garrison at Abu Hamed, that garrison would be dislodged and the place seized.

The plan was perfect, and the argument in its favour conclusive.  It turned, however, on one point:  Was the Desert Railway a possibility?  With this question the General was now confronted.  He appealed to expert opinion.  Eminent railway engineers in England were consulted.  They replied with unanimity that, having due regard to the circumstances, and remembering the conditions of war under which the work must be executed, it was impossible to construct such a line.  Distinguished soldiers were approached on the subject.  They replied that the scheme was not only impossible, but absurd.  Many other persons who were not consulted volunteered the opinion that the whole idea was that of a lunatic, and predicted ruin and disaster to the expedition.  Having received this advice, and reflected on it duly, the Sirdar ordered the railway to be constructed without more delay.