Both forces remained during the day facing each other on opposite sides of the river, and the Dervishes, who evidently did not admit a defeat, brandished their rifles and waved their flags, and their shouts of loud defiance floated across the water to the troops.  But they had suffered very heavily.  Their brave and skilful leader was severely wounded by the splinters of a shell.  The wicked Osman Azrak had been struck by a bullet, and more than 200 Ansar had fallen, including several Emirs.  Moreover, a long train of wounded was seen to start during the afternoon for the south.  It is doubtful, however, whether Bishara would have retreated, if he had not feared being cut off.  He seems to have believed that the Sirdar would march along the right bank at once to Dongola, and cross there under cover of his gunboats.  Like all Moslem soldiers, he was nervous about his line of retreat.  Nor, considering the overwhelming force against him, can we wonder.  There was, besides this strategic reason for retiring, a more concrete cause.  All his supplies of grain were accumulated in the gyassas which lay moored to the west bank.  These vessels were under the close and accurate fire of the artillery and Maxim guns on Artagasha island.  Several times during the night the hungry Dervishes attempted to reach their store; but the moon was bright and the gunners watchful.  Each time the enemy exposed themselves, a vigorous fire was opened and they were driven back.  When morning dawned, it was found that Hafir was evacuated, and that the enemy had retreated on Dongola.

Wad Bishara’s anxiety about his line of retreat was unnecessary, for the Sirdar could not advance on Dongola with a strong Dervish force on his line of communications:  and it was not desirable to divide the army and mask Hafir with a covering force.  But as soon as the Dervishes had left their entrenchments the situation was simplified.  At daybreak all the Arab boats were brought over to the right bank by the villagers, who reported that Bishara and his soldiers had abandoned the defence and were retreating to Dongola.  Thereupon the Sirdar, relieved of the necessity of forcing the passage, transported his army peacefully to the other bank.  The operation afforded scope to his powers of organisation, and the whole force—­complete with cavalry, camels, and guns—­was moved across the broad, rushing river in less than thirty-six hours and without any apparent difficulty.

The casualties on the 19th were not numerous, and in a force of nearly 15,000 men they appear insignificant.  Commander Colville was wounded.  One British sergeant and one Egyptian officer were killed.  Eleven native soldiers were wounded.  The total—­fourteen—­amounted to less than one per thousand of the troops engaged.  Nevertheless this picturesque and bloodless affair has been solemnly called the ‘Battle of Hafir.’  Special despatches were written for it.  It is officially counted in records of service as a ‘general action.’  Telegrams of congratulation were received from her Majesty and the Khedive.  A special clasp was struck.  Of all the instances of cheaply bought glory which the military history of recent years affords, Hafir is the most remarkable.