The two men then separated, Sillery enjoining it upon the envoy to see the king next morning, “in order to explain to his Majesty, as he had just been doing to himself, that this sovereignty could not be transferred, without the consent of the whole people, nor the people be consulted in secret.”

“It is necessary therefore to be armed,” continued Henry’s minister very significantly, “before aspiring to the sovereignty.”

Thus there was a faint glimmer of appreciation at the French court of the meaning of popular sovereignty.  It did not occur to the minister that the right of giving consent was to be respected.  The little obstacle was to be overcome by stratagem and by force.  Prince Maurice was to put French garrisons stealthily into Sluys and other towns conquered by the republic in Flanders.  Then the magnanimous ally was to rise at the right moment and overcome all resistance by force of arms.  The plot was a good one.  It is passing strange, however, that the character of the Nassaus and of the Dutch nation should after the last fifty years have been still so misunderstood.  It seemed in France possible that Maurice would thus defile his honour and the Netherlanders barter their liberty, by accepting a new tyrant in place of the one so long ago deposed.

“This is the marrow of our conference,” said Aerssens to Barneveld, reporting the interview, “and you may thus perceive whither are tending the designs of his Majesty.  It seems that they are aspiring here to the sovereignty, and all my letters have asserted the contrary.  If you will examine a little more closely, however, you will find that there is no contradiction.  This acquisition would be desirable for France if it could be made peacefully.  As it can only be effected by war you may make sure that it will not be attempted; for the great maxim and basis of this kingdom is to preserve repose, and at the same time give such occupation to the King of Spain that his means shall be consumed and his designs frustrated.  All this will cease if we make peace.

“Thus in treating with the king we must observe two rules.  The first is that we can maintain ourselves no longer unless powerfully assisted, and that, the people inclining to peace, we shall be obliged to obey the people.  Secondly, we must let no difficulty appear as to the desire expressed by his Majesty to have the sovereignty of these provinces.  We ought to let him hope for it, but to make him understand that by ordinary and legitimate means he cannot aspire to it.  We will make him think that we have an equal desire with himself, and we shall thus take from those evil-disposed counsellors the power to injure us who are always persuading him that he is only making us great for ourselves, and thus giving us the power to injure him.  In short, the king can hope nothing from us overtly, and certainly nothing covertly.  By explaining to him that we require the authorization of the people, and by showing ourselves prompt to