their proceedings by the necessity of self-defence.  They had avowed—­in case they should be made sure of peace—­that they should, not with reluctance and against their will, but, on the contrary, with the utmost alacrity and at once, surrender to the King of Spain the territory which they possessed in the Netherlands, and especially the fortified towns in Holland and Zeeland; for the English object had never been conquest.  Parma had also been informed of the Queen’s strong desire that he should be employed as negotiator, on account of her great confidence in his sincerity.  They had expressed much satisfaction on hearing that he was about to send an agent to England, and had protested themselves rejoiced at Drake’s triumphs, only because of their hope that a peace with Spain would thus be rendered the easier of accomplishment.  They were much afraid, according to Grafigni, of Philip’s power, and dreaded a Spanish invasion of their country, in conjunction with the Pope.  They were now extremely anxious that Parma—­as he himself informed the King—­should send an agent of good capacity, in great secrecy, to England.

The Comptroller had said that he had pledged himself to such a result, and if it failed, that they would probably cut off his head.  The four counsellors were excessively solicitous for the negotiation, and each of them was expecting to gain favour by advancing it to the best of his ability.

Parma hinted at the possibility that all these professions were false, and that the English were only intending to keep the King from the contemplated invasion.  At the same time he drew Philip’s attention to the fact that Burghley and his party had most evidently been doing everything in their power to obstruct Leicester’s progress in the Netherlands and to keep back the reinforcements of troops and money which he so much required.

No doubt these communications of Parma to the King were made upon the faith of an agent not over-scrupulous, and of no elevated or recognised rank in diplomacy.  It must be borne in mind, however, that he had been made use of by both parties; perhaps because it would be easy to throw off, and discredit, him whenever such a step should be convenient; and that, on the other hand, coming fresh from Burghley and the rest into the presence of the keen-eyed Farnese, he would hardly invent for his employer a budget of falsehoods.  That man must have been a subtle negotiator who could outwit such a statesman as Burghley—­and the other counsellors of Elizabeth, and a bold one who could dare to trifle on a momentous occasion with Alexander of Parma.

Leicester thought Burghley very much his friend, and so thought Davison and Heneage; and the Lord-Treasurer had, in truth, stood stoutly by the Earl in the affair of the absolute governorship;—­“a matter more severe and cumbersome to him and others,” said Burghley, “than any whatsoever since he was a counsellor.”  But there is no doubt that these negotiations were going forward all the