of William the Silent, the author of the ‘Wilhelmus’ national song, now avowed his conviction, in a published defence of his conduct against the calumnious attacks upon it, “that it was impossible, with a clear conscience, for subjects, under any circumstances, to take up arms against Philip, their king.”  Certainly if he had always entertained that opinion he must have suffered many pangs of remorse during his twenty years of active and illustrious rebellion.  He now made himself secretly active in promoting the schemes of Parma and in counteracting the negotiation with England.  He flattered himself, with an infatuation which it is difficult to comprehend, that it would be possible to obtain religious liberty for the revolting Provinces, although he had consented to its sacrifice in Antwerp.  It is true that he had not the privilege of reading Philip’s secret letters to Parma, but what was there in the character of the King—­what intimation had ever been given by the Governor-General—­to induce a belief in even the possibility of such a concession?

Whatever Sainte Aldegonde’s opinions, it is certain that Philip had no intention of changing his own policy.  He at first suspected the burgomaster of a wish to protract the negotiations for a perfidious purpose.

“Necessity has forced Antwerp,” he wrote on the 17th of August—­the very day on which the capitulation was actually signed—­“to enter into negotiation.  I understand the artifice of Aldegonde in seeking to prolong and make difficult the whole affair, under pretext of treating for the reduction of Holland and Zeeland at the same time.  It was therefore very adroit in you to defeat this joint scheme at once, and urge the Antwerp matter by itself, at the same time not shutting the door on the others.  With the prudence and dexterity with which this business has thus far been managed I am thoroughly satisfied.”

The King also expressed his gratification at hearing from Parma that the demand for religious liberty in the Netherlands would soon be abandoned.

“In spite of the vehemence,” he said, “which they manifest in the religious matter, desiring some kind of liberty, they will in the end, as you say they will, content themselves with what the other cities, which have returned to obedience, have obtained.  This must be done in all cases without flinching, and without permitting any modification.”

What “had been obtained” by Brussels, Mechlin, Ghent, was well known.  The heretics had obtained the choice of renouncing their religion or of going into perpetual exile, and this was to be the case “without flinching” in Holland and Zeeland, if those provinces chose to return to obedience.  Yet Sainte Aldegonde deluded himself with the thought of a religious peace.

In another and very important letter of the same date Philip laid down his policy very distinctly.  The Prince of Parma, by no means such a bigot as his master, had hinted at the possibility of tolerating the reformed religion in the places recovered from the rebels, sub silentio, for a period not defined, and long enough for the heretics to awake from their errors.