Treason and malice in his cabinet and household, jealousy and fear abroad, were working upon and undermining him like a slow fever.  His position was most pathetic, but his purpose was fixed.

James of England, who admired, envied, and hated Henry, was wont to moralize on his character and his general unpopularity, while engaged in negotiations with him.  He complained that in the whole affair of the truce he had sought only his particular advantage.  “This is not to be wondered at in one of his nature,” said the King, “who only careth to provide for the felicities of his present life, without any respect for his life to come.  Indeed, the consideration of his own age and the youth of his children, the doubt of their legitimation, the strength of competitioners, and the universal hatred borne unto him, makes him seek all means of security for preventing of all dangers.”

There were changes from day to day; hot and cold fits necessarily resulting from the situation.  As a rule, no eminent general who has had much experience wishes to go into a new war inconsiderately and for the mere love of war.  The impatience is often on the part of the non-combatants.  Henry was no exception to the rule.  He felt that the complications then existing, the religious, political, and dynastic elements arrayed against each other, were almost certain to be brought to a crisis and explosion by the incident of the duchies.  He felt that the impending struggle was probably to be a desperate and a general one, but there was no inconsistency in hoping that the show of a vigorous and menacing attitude might suspend, defer, or entirely dissipate the impending storm.

The appearance of vacillation on his part from day to day was hardly deserving of the grave censure which it received, and was certainly in the interests of humanity.

His conferences with Sully were almost daily and marked by intense anxiety.  He longed for Barneveld, and repeatedly urged that the Advocate, laying aside all other business, would come to Paris, that they might advise together thoroughly and face to face.  It was most important that the combination of alliances should be correctly arranged before hostilities began, and herein lay the precise difficulty.  The princes applied formally and freely to the States-General for assistance.  They applied to the King of Great Britain.  The agents of the opposite party besieged Henry with entreaties, and, failing in those, with threats; going off afterwards to Spain, to the Archdukes, and to other Catholic powers in search of assistance.

The States-General professed their readiness to put an army of 15,000 foot and 3000 horse in the field for the spring campaign, so soon as they were assured of Henry’s determination for a rupture.

“I am fresh enough still,” said he to their ambassador, “to lead an army into Cleve.  I shall have a cheap bargain enough of the provinces.  But these Germans do nothing but eat and sleep.  They will get the profit and assign to me the trouble.  No matter, I will never suffer the aggrandizement of the House of Austria.  The States-General must disband no troops, but hold themselves in readiness.”