“’Tis certain,” he complained, “that if, instead of this sluggishness on the part of France, they had done us there the same good services we have had from England, the Hollanders would have accepted the promise just as it was proposed by us.”  He implored the King, therefore, to use his strongest influence with the French government that it should strenuously intervene with the Hollanders, and compel them to sign the proposal which they rejected.  “There is no means of composition if France does not oblige them to sign,” said Albert rather piteously.

But it was not without reason that Barneveld had in many of his letters instructed the States’ ambassador, Langerac, “to caress the old gentleman” (meaning and never naming Villeroy), for he would prove to be in spite of all obstacles a good friend to the States, as he always had been.  And Villeroy did hold firm.  Whether the Archduke was right or not in his conviction, that, if France would only unite with England in exerting a strong pressure on the Hollanders, they would evacuate the duchies, and so give up the game, the correspondence of Barneveld shows very accurately.  But the Archduke, of course, had not seen that correspondence.

The Advocate knew what was plotting, what was impending, what was actually accomplished, for he was accustomed to sweep the whole horizon with an anxious and comprehensive glance.  He knew without requiring to read the secret letters of the enemy that vast preparations for an extensive war against the Reformation were already completed.  The movements in the duchies were the first drops of a coming deluge.  The great religious war which was to last a generation of mankind had already begun; the immediate and apparent pretext being a little disputed succession to some petty sovereignties, the true cause being the necessity for each great party—­the Protestant Union and the Catholic League—­to secure these border provinces, the possession of which would be of such inestimable advantage to either.  If nothing decisive occurred in the year 1614, the following year would still be more convenient for the League.  There had been troubles in Turkey.  The Grand Vizier had been murdered.  The Sultan was engaged in a war with Persia.  There was no eastern bulwark in Europe to the ever menacing power of the Turk and of Mahometanism in Europe save Hungary alone.  Supported and ruled as that kingdom was by the House of Austria, the temper of the populations of Germany had become such as to make it doubtful in the present conflict of religious opinions between them and their rulers whether the Turk or the Spaniard would be most odious as an invader.  But for the moment, Spain and the Emperor had their hands free.  They were not in danger of an attack from below the Danube.  Moreover, the Spanish fleet had been achieving considerable successes on the Barbary coast, having seized La Roche, and one or two important citadels, useful both against the corsairs and against sudden attacks by sea from the Turk.  There were at least 100,000 men on a war footing ready to take the field at command of the two branches of the House of Austria, Spanish and German.  In the little war about Montserrat, Savoy was on the point of being crushed, and Savoy was by position and policy the only possible ally, in the south, of the Netherlands and of Protestant Germany.