His influence in France was always greater than in England, and this had likewise been the case with William the Silent.  And even now that the Spanish matrimonial alliance was almost a settled matter at the French court, while with the English king it was but a perpetual will-o’the-wisp conducting to quagmires ineffable, the government at Paris sustained the policy of the Advocate with tolerable fidelity, while it was constantly and most capriciously traversed by James.

Barneveld sighed over these approaching nuptials, but did not yet despair.  “We hope that the Spanish-French marriages,” he said, “may be broken up of themselves; but we fear that if we should attempt to delay or prevent them authoritatively, or in conjunction with others, the effort would have the contrary effect.”

In this certainly he was doomed to disappointment.

He had already notified the French court of the absolute necessity of the great points to be insisted upon in the treaty, and there he found more docility than in London or Newmarket.

All summer he was occupied with this most important matter, uttering Cassandra-like warnings into ears wilfully deaf.  The States had gone as far as possible in concession.  To go farther would be to wreck the great cause upon the very quicksands which he had so ceaselessly pointed out.  “We hope that nothing further will be asked of us, no scruples be felt as to our good intentions,” he said, “and that if Spain and the Archdukes are not ready now to fulfil the treaty, their Majesties will know how to resent this trifling with their authority and dignity, and how to set matters to rights with their own hands in the duchies.  A new treaty, still less a sequestration, is not to be thought of for a moment.”

Yet the month of August came and still the names of the mediating kings were not on the treaty, and still the spectre of sequestration had not been laid.  On the contrary, the peace of Asti, huddled up between Spain and Savoy, to be soon broken again, had caused new and painful apprehensions of an attempt at sequestration, for it was established by several articles in that treaty that all questions between Savoy and Mantua should be referred to the Emperor’s decision.  This precedent was sure to be followed in the duchies if not resisted by force, as it had been so successfully resisted five years before by the armies of the States associated with those of France.  Moreover the first step at sequestration had been actually taken.  The Emperor had peremptorily summoned the Elector of Brandenburg and all other parties interested to appear before him on the 1st of August in Prague.  There could be but one object in this citation, to drive Brandenburg and the States out of the duchies until the Imperial decision as to the legitimate sovereignty should be given.  Neuburg being already disposed of and his claims ceded to the Emperor, what possibility was there in such circumstances of saving one scrap