“We are led to doubt,” he wrote once more to the envoy in France, “whether the King’s full powers will come from Spain.  This defeat is hard for the Spaniards to digest.  Meantime our burdens are quite above our capacity, as you will understand by the enclosed statement, which is made out with much exactness to show what is absolutely necessary for a vigorous defence on land and a respectable position at sea to keep things from entire confusion.  The Provinces could raise means for the half of this estimate.  But, it is a great difference when the means differ one half from the expenses.  The sovereignst and most assured remedy would be the one so often demanded, often projected, and sometimes almost prepared for execution, namely that our neighbour kings, princes, and republics should earnestly take the matter in hand and drive the Spaniards and their adherents out of the Netherlands and over the mountains.  Their own dignity and security ought not to permit such great bodies of troops of both belligerents permanently massed in the Netherlands.  Still less ought they to allow these Provinces to fall into the hands of the Spaniards, whence they could with so much more power and convenience make war upon all kings, princes, and republics.  This must be prevented by one means or another.  It ought to be enough for every one that we have been between thirty and forty years a firm bulwark against Spanish ambition.  Our constancy and patience ought to be strengthened by counsel and by deed in order that we may exist; a Christian sympathy and a small assistance not being sufficient.  Believe and cause to be believed that the present condition of our affairs requires more aid in counsel and money than ever before, and that nothing could be better bestowed than to further this end.

“Messieurs Jeannin, Buzenval, and de Russy have been all here these twelve days.  We have firm hopes that other kings, princes, and republics will not stay upon formalities, but will also visit the patients here in order to administer sovereign remedies.

“Lend no ear to any flying reports.  We say with the wise men over there, ‘Metuo Danaos et dons ferentes.’  We know our antagonists well, and trust their hearts no more than before, ‘sed ultra posse non est esse.’  To accept more burthens than we can pay for will breed military mutiny; to tax the community above its strength will cause popular tumults, especially in ‘rebus adversis,’ of which the beginnings were seen last year, and without a powerful army the enemy is not to be withstood.  I have received your letters to the 17th May.  My advice is to trust to his upright proceedings and with patience to overcome all things.  Thus shall the detractors and calumniators best be confounded.  Assure his Majesty and his ministers that I will do my utmost to avert our ruin and his Majesty’s disservice.”

The treaty was made, and from that time forth the antagonism between the eminent statesman and the great military chieftain became inevitable.  The importance of the one seemed likely to increase day by day.  The occupation of the other for a time was over.