The various details of these negotiations have been related by the author in other volumes, to which the present one is intended as a sequel.  It has been thought necessary merely to recall very briefly a few salient passages in the career of the Advocate up to the period when the present history really opens.

Their bearing upon subsequent events will easily be observed.  The truce was the work of Barneveld.  It was detested by Maurice and by Maurice’s partisans.

“I fear that our enemies and evil reports are the cause of many of our difficulties,” said the Advocate to the States’ envoy in Paris, in 1606.  “You are to pay no heed to private advices.  Believe and make others believe that more than one half the inhabitants of the cities and in the open country are inclined to peace.  And I believe, in case of continuing adversities, that the other half will not remain constant, principally because the Provinces are robbed of all traffic, prosperity, and navigation, through the actions of France and England.  I have always thought it for the advantage of his Majesty to sustain us in such wise as would make us useful in his service.  As to his remaining permanently at peace with Spain, that would seem quite out of the question.”

The King had long kept, according to treaty, a couple of French regiments in the States’ service, and furnished, or was bound to furnish, a certain yearly sum for their support.  But the expenses of the campaigning had been rapidly increasing and the results as swiftly dwindling.  The Advocate now explained that, “without loss both of important places and of reputation,” the States could not help spending every month that they took the field 200,000 florins over and above the regular contributions, and some months a great deal more.  This sum, he said, in nine months, would more than eat up the whole subsidy of the King.  If they were to be in the field by March or beginning of April, they would require from him an extraordinary sum of 200,000 crowns, and as much more in June or July.

Eighteen months later, when the magnificent naval victory of Heemskerk in the Bay of Gibraltar had just made a startling interlude to the languishing negotiations for peace, the Advocate again warned the French King of the difficulty in which the Republic still laboured of carrying on the mighty struggle alone.  Spain was the common enemy of all.  No peace or hope was possible for the leading powers as long as Spain was perpetually encamped in the very heart of Western Europe.  The Netherlands were not fighting their own battle merely, but that of freedom and independence against the all-encroaching world-power.  And their means to carry on the conflict were dwindling, while at the same time there was a favourable opportunity for cropping some fruit from their previous labours and sacrifices.