The King had long kept, according to treaty, a couple of French regiments in the States’ service, and furnished, or was bound to furnish, a certain yearly sum for their support.  But the expenses of the campaigning had been rapidly increasing and the results as swiftly dwindling.  The Advocate now explained that, “without loss both of important places and of reputation,” the States could not help spending every month that they took the field 200,000 florins over and above the regular contributions, and some months a great deal more.  This sum, he said, in nine months, would more than eat up the whole subsidy of the King.  If they were to be in the field by March or beginning of April, they would require from him an extraordinary sum of 200,000 crowns, and as much more in June or July.

Eighteen months later, when the magnificent naval victory of Heemskerk in the Bay of Gibraltar had just made a startling interlude to the languishing negotiations for peace, the Advocate again warned the French King of the difficulty in which the Republic still laboured of carrying on the mighty struggle alone.  Spain was the common enemy of all.  No peace or hope was possible for the leading powers as long as Spain was perpetually encamped in the very heart of Western Europe.  The Netherlands were not fighting their own battle merely, but that of freedom and independence against the all-encroaching world-power.  And their means to carry on the conflict were dwindling, while at the same time there was a favourable opportunity for cropping some fruit from their previous labours and sacrifices.

“We are led to doubt,” he wrote once more to the envoy in France, “whether the King’s full powers will come from Spain.  This defeat is hard for the Spaniards to digest.  Meantime our burdens are quite above our capacity, as you will understand by the enclosed statement, which is made out with much exactness to show what is absolutely necessary for a vigorous defence on land and a respectable position at sea to keep things from entire confusion.  The Provinces could raise means for the half of this estimate.  But, it is a great difference when the means differ one half from the expenses.  The sovereignst and most assured remedy would be the one so often demanded, often projected, and sometimes almost prepared for execution, namely that our neighbour kings, princes, and republics should earnestly take the matter in hand and drive the Spaniards and their adherents out of the Netherlands and over the mountains.  Their own dignity and security ought not to permit such great bodies of troops of both belligerents permanently massed in the Netherlands.  Still less ought they to allow these Provinces to fall into the hands of the Spaniards, whence they could with so much more power and convenience make war upon all kings, princes, and republics.  This must be prevented by one means or another.  It ought to be enough for every one that we have been between thirty and forty years