necessary even should he ultimately make himself sovereign of the whole country.  Rosny assured the envoy that he was mistaken in expecting a declaration of war against Spain.  “Not that he does not think it useful and necessary,” said the minister, “but he wishes to have war and peace both at once—­peace because he wishes to make no retrenchments in his pleasures of women, dogs, and buildings, and so war would be very inopportune.  In three months he would be obliged to turn tail for want of means (to use his own words), although I would furnish him funds enough, if he would make the use of them that he ought.”

The Queen of England, who, with all her parsimony and false pretences, never doubted in her heart that perpetual hostility to Spain was the chief bulwark of her throne, and that the republic was fighting her battles as well as its own, had been ready to make such a lively war in conjunction with France as would drive the Spaniard out of all the Netherlands.  But Henry was not to be moved.  “I know that if I should take her at her word,” said he, “she would at once begin to screw me for money.  She has one object, I another.”  Villeroy had said plainly to Aerssens, in regard to the prevalent system of Englishmen, Spaniards, and Frenchmen being at war with each other, while the Governments might be nominally at peace, “Let us take off our masks.  If the Spaniard has designs against our State, has he not cause?  He knows the aid we are giving you, and resents it.  If we should abstain, he would leave us in peace.  If the Queen of England expects to draw us into a league, she is mistaken.  Look to yourselves and be on your guard.  Richardot is intriguing with Cecil.  You give the queen securities, fortresses, seats in your council.  The king asks nothing but communication of your projects.”

In short, all the comfort that Aerssens had been able to derive from his experiences at the French court in the autumn of 1602, was that the republic could not be too suspicious both of England and France.  Rosny especially he considered the most dangerous of all the politicians in France.  His daughter was married to the Prince of Espinoy, whose 50,000 livres a year would be safer the more the archduke was strengthened.  “But for this he would be stiffer,” said Aerssens.  Nevertheless there were strong motives at work, pressing France towards the support of the States.  There were strong political reasons, therefore, why they should carry the war into Flanders, in conformity with the wishes of the king.

The stadholder, after much argument, yielded as usual to the authority of the magistrates, without being convinced as to the sagacity of their plans.  It was arranged that an army should make a descent upon the Flemish coast in the early spring, and make a demonstration upon Sluys.  The effect of this movement, it was thought, would be to draw the enemy out of his entrenchments, in which case it would be