rate of interest, by the Fuggers of Antwerp, might be duly provided for at maturity.  “I earnestly beg,” said Escovedo, “that your Majesty will see to the payment of these bills, at all events;” adding, with amusing simplicity, “this will be a means of recovering your Majesty’s credit, and as for my own; I don’t care to lose it, small though it be.”  Don John was even more solicitous.  “For the love of God, Sire,” he wrote, “do not be delinquent now.  You must reflect upon the necessity of recovering your credit.  If this receives now the final blow, all will desert your Majesty, and the soldiers too will be driven to desperation.”

By dint of great diligence on the part of Escovedo, and through the confidence reposed in his character, the necessary funds were raised in the course of a few weeks.  There was, however, a difficulty among the officers, as to the right of commanding the army on the homeward march.  Don Alonzo de Vargas, as chief of the cavalry, was appointed to the post by the Governor, but Valdez, Romero, and other veterans, indignantly refused to serve under one whom they declared their inferior officer.  There was much altercation and heartburning, and an attempt was made to compromise the matter by the appointment of Count Mansfeld to the chief command.  This was, however, only adding fuel to the flames.  All were dissatisfied with the superiority accorded to a foreigner, and Alonzo de Vargas, especially offended, addressed most insolent language to the Governor.  Nevertheless, the arrangement was maintained, and the troops finally took their departure from the country, in the latter days of April.  A vast concourse of citizens witnessed their departure, and could hardly believe their eyes, as they saw this incubus at last rolling off, by which the land had so many years been crushed.  Their joy, although extravagant, was, however, limited by the reflection that ten thousand Germans still remained in the provinces, attached to the royal service, and that there was even yet a possibility that the departure of the Spaniards was a feint.  In truth, Escovedo, although seconding the orders of Don John, to procure the removal of these troops, did not scruple to express his regret to the King, and his doubts as to the result.  He had been ever in hopes that an excuse might be found in the condition of affairs in France, to justify the retention of the forces near that frontier.  He assured the King that he felt very doubtful as to what turn matters might take, after the soldiers were gone, seeing the great unruliness which even their presence had been insufficient completely to check.  He had hoped that they might be retained in the neighbourhood, ready to seize the islands at the first opportunity.  “For my part,” he wrote, “I care nothing for the occupation of places within the interior, but the islands must be secured.  To do this,” he continued, with a deceitful allusion to the secret projects of Don John, “is, in my opinion, more difficult than to effect the scheme upon England.  If the one were accomplished, the other would be easily enough managed, and would require but moderate means.  Let not your Majesty suppose that I say this as favoring the plan of Don John, for this I put entirely behind me.”