Policy of electing Anjou as sovereign—­Commode et incommode—­Views of Orange—­Opinions at the French Court,—­Anjou relieves Cambray—­ Parma besieges Tourney—­Brave defence by the Princess of Espinoy—­ Honorable capitulation—­Anjou’s courtship in England—­The Duke’s arrival in the Netherlands—­Portrait of Anjou—­Festivities in Flushing—­Inauguration at Antwerp—­The conditions or articles subscribed to by the Duke—­Attempt upon the life of Orange—­The assassin’s papers—­Confession of Venero—­Gaspar Anastro—­His escape —­Execution of Venero and Zimmermann—­Precarious condition of the Prince—­His recovery—­Death of the Princess—­Premature letters of Parma—­Further negotiations with Orange as to the sovereignty of Holland and Zealand—­Character of the revised Constitution—­ Comparison of the positions of the Prince before and after his acceptance of the countship.

Thus it was arranged that, for the—­present, at least, the Prince should exercise sovereignty over Holland and Zealand; although he had himself used his utmost exertions to induce those provinces to join the rest of the United Netherlands in the proposed election of Anjou.  This, however, they sternly refused to do.  There was also a great disinclination felt by many in the other states to this hazardous offer of their allegiance, and it was the personal influence of Orange that eventually carried the measure through.  Looking at the position of affairs and at the character of Anjou, as they appear to us now, it seems difficult to account for the Prince’s policy.  It is so natural to judge only by the result, that we are ready to censure statesmen for consequences which beforehand might seem utterly incredible, and for reading falsely human characters whose entire development only a late posterity has had full opportunity to appreciate.  Still, one would think that Anjou had been sufficiently known to inspire distrust.

There was but little, too, in the aspect of the French court to encourage hopes of valuable assistance from that quarter.  It was urged, not without reason, that the French were as likely to become as dangerous as the Spaniards; that they would prove nearer and more troublesome masters; that France intended the incorporation of the Netherlands into her own kingdom; that the provinces would therefore be dispersed for ever from the German Empire; and that it was as well to hold to the tyrant under whom they had been born, as to give themselves voluntarily to another of their own making.  In short, it was maintained, in homely language, that “France and Spain were both under one coverlid.”  It might have been added that only extreme misery could make the provinces take either bedfellow.  Moreover, it was asserted, with reason, that Anjou would be a very expensive master, for his luxurious and extravagant habits were notorious—­that he was a man in whom no confidence could be placed, and one who would grasp at arbitrary power by any means which might present themselves.