The Duke’s military fame was unquestionable when he came to the provinces, and both in stricken fields and in long campaigns, he showed how thoroughly it had been deserved; yet he left the Netherlands a baffled man.  The Prince might be many times defeated, but he was not to be conquered.  As Alva penetrated into the heart of the ancient Batavian land he found himself overmatched as he had never been before, even by the most potent generals of his day.  More audacious, more inventive, more desperate than all the commanders of that or any other age, the spirit of national freedom, now taught the oppressor that it was invincible; except by annihilation.  The same lesson had been read in the same thickets by the Nervii to Julius Caesar, by the Batavians to the legions of Vespasian; and now a loftier and a purer flame than that which inspired the national struggles against Rome glowed within the breasts of the descendants of the same people, and inspired them with the strength which comes, from religious enthusiasm.  More experienced, more subtle, more politic than Hermann; more devoted, more patient, more magnanimous than Civilis, and equal to either in valor and determination, William of Orange was a worthy embodiment of the Christian, national resistance of the German race to a foreign tyranny.  Alva had entered the Netherlands to deal with them as with conquered provinces.  He found that the conquest was still to be made, and he left the land without having accomplished it.  Through the sea of blood, the Hollanders felt that they were passing to the promised land.  More royal soldiers fell during the seven months’ siege of Harlem than the rebels had lost in the defeat of Jemmingen, and in the famous campaign of Brabant.  At Alkmaar the rolling waves of insolent conquest were stayed, and the tide then ebbed for ever.

The accomplished soldier struggled hopelessly, with the wild and passionate hatred which his tyranny had provoked.  Neither his legions nor his consummate strategy availed him against an entirely desperate people.  As a military commander, therefore, he gained, upon the whole, no additional laurels during his long administration of the Netherlands.  Of all the other attributes to be expected in a man appointed to deal with a free country, in a state of incipient rebellion, he manifested a signal deficiency.  As a financier, he exhibited a wonderful ignorance of the first principles of political economy.  No man before, ever gravely proposed to establish confiscation as a permanent source of revenue to the state; yet the annual product from the escheated property of slaughtered heretics was regularly relied upon, during his administration, to replenish the King’s treasury, and to support the war of extermination against the King’s subjects.  Nor did statesman ever before expect a vast income from the commerce of a nation devoted to almost universal massacre.  During the daily decimation of the people’s lives, he thought a daily decimation of their industry