it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c.  For all these things I affirm do exist.  Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.  Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view.  Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.

HYL.  I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same mistaking the question.  In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel:  but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it.  What think you, therefore, of retaining the name matter, and applying it to sensible things?  This may be done without any change in your sentiments:  and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

Phil.  With all my heart:  retain the word matter, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.  I shall never quarrel with you for an expression.  Matter, or material substance, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind:  but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense.  One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the terms sensible, substance, body, stuff, and the like, are retained, the word matter should be never missed in common talk.  And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out:  since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

HYL.  Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word matter as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind.  I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit.  But I have been so long accustomed to the term matter that I know not how to part with it:  to say, there is no matter in the world, is still shocking to me.  Whereas to say—­There is no matter, if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by matter is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being