of finite extension; which depends on that supposition—­But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences?  Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation?  Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence?  Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon’s neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight.  But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;—­however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature.  For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the irregular visions of the fancy.

HYL.  I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with.  I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge.  What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of immaterialism!

Phil.  After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done?  You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.  This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal things.  Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared.  Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

HYL.  I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.  But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?

Phil.  Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to?  Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration?  Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it?  If there are difficulties attending immaterialism,