Phil.  What would you have?  Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things—­the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal?  The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God.  Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation?  But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.  To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point.  Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score:  or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away?  You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason.  Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you.  If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it.  And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything.  And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation’s being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

HYL.  I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation.

Phil.  I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied.  You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism:  but you know not where it lies.  Is this reasonable, Hylas?  Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is?  But, to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

HYL.  And so I am.

Phil.  Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?

HYL.  In the plain sense, doubtless.

Phil.  When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

HYL.  I cannot help thinking so.

Phil.  And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

HYL.  This I have already acknowledged.

Phil.  The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?