HYL.  You have indeed clearly satisfied me—­either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

Phil.  But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

HYL.  I acknowledge it.  But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you advance against scepticism, it amounts to no more than this:  We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.

Phil.  And how are we concerned any farther?  I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it:  and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or. tasted:  it is therefore red.  Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations.  A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:  which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other.  Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c.  Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations.  But if by the word cherry you, mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its existence something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

HYL.  But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things in A mind, which you have offered against their existing in A material substratum?

Phil.  When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them.

HYL.  Is the mind extended or unextended?

Phil.  Unextended, without doubt.

HYL.  Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

Phil.  They are.

HYL.  Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

Phil.  I believe you may.

HYL.  Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind.  Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended?  Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity?  You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study:  or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax.  In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions?  Explain me this if you can:  and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my substratum.